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Electricity Consumer Choice in Ohio

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
It took nearly a decade of sorting out regulatory problems, but by 2011 deregulation of the market
for electricity generation in Ohio began to work exactly how economic theory projected it would.
Since 2011, a robust retail market for electricity has developed in Ohio. As a result, deregulation
of electricity has saved consumers an average of $3 billion per year, for a total of $15 billion over
five years. Moreover, it is projected to continue to save consumers nearly that amount for the
next five years, through 2020, totaling another $15 billion in savings. Further, the Midwestern
deregulated states (Ohio, Pennsylvania and Illinois) have, over time, outperformed their regulated
Midwestern neighbors (Michigan, Indiana and Wisconsin) in terms of constraining electricity cost
increases for their consumers.
This Study was undertaken to assess the effects that deregulation of electricity generation has had
on electricity prices in Ohio. Deregulation has become controversial in Ohio as several of Ohio’s
investor-owned utilities (“IOUs”) sought price supports for their uncompetitive generation
facilities. The IOUs sought these supports even though Ohio had deregulated the generation side
of the electricity business in 2001.
The utilities argued that the price supports were necessary because without them, major existing
generation facilities would be shut down, threatening grid reliability and increasing price volatility.
In short, they argued that competition in Ohio had become a problem for the IOUs, whose aging
generation fleet was struggling to remain competitive. Accordingly, Ohio’s IOUs sought, and
received, authority from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) to assess ratepayers with
additional fees to subsidize the flagging generation fleets.
The Federal Regulatory Commission subsequently determined that the proposed price supports,
which would have been passed through to ratepayers as a rider on the regulated distribution side
of their business, were improper, finding that they were inconsistent with deregulated generating
markets and threatened to undermine regional wholesale electricity markets. Consequently, the
IOUs have begun to argue through media and other venues that Ohio should abandon its
deregulated electricity markets in favor of the traditional fully regulated monopoly model that
American utilities have followed for most of the 20th century.
Such a strategy, however, would cost Ohio’s ratepayers significantly. The research contained in
this Study demonstrates that Ohio consumers have realized billions of dollars in savings in each of
the past five years due to the deregulation of electricity generation. The savings have been
realized in part because Ohio’s IOUs have begun setting their electricity generation standard
service offers (SSO, also called “Price to Compare,” or “PTC”) through competitive auctions, and
in part because over 70% of Ohio’s IOU electricity load is shopped. Further, these savings are in
keeping with trends seen by other states that have switched to competitive electricity generation.
These results are consistent with research that examines the effects of deregulation, which on the
whole find that deregulation reduces electricity prices, or at least growth in those prices. As has
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been done in other studies, this Study relied on data from the Energy Information Agency,
comparing electricity price in similarly situated states in the Midwest, namely Ohio, Illinois and
Pennsylvania (all deregulated their markets for power generation) against Wisconsin, Indiana and
Michigan (all mostly regulated). However, the Study differed from most prior studies in two
important ways. First, the Study Team used difference-in-difference statistical modeling to
control for variables that would affect electricity price (e.g. time-related trends). Second, the
Study Team assessed savings due to shopping.
The reason why prior studies have not sought to evaluate savings from shopping is that the data
supporting such a study are not publicly available. The Study Team resolved this problem by
organizing the shopping data into two sets: mercantile (greater than 700,000 kWh/year
consumption) and non-mercantile (less than 700,000 kWh/year). For the non-mercantile group,
the Study Team assumed a savings rate of 6% for residential shoppers and 4% for commercial
shoppers off of the Price to Compare. These rate discounts have generally been available from
aggregators in Ohio in the past five years. For mercantile users, the Study Team used data that
were aggregated from private data banks held by local brokers who track electricity procurement
by their clients.
Analysis of the pricing data demonstrates that Ohio ratepayers have avoided nearly $15 billion in
charges over the past five years as a result of competition. Of this, around $3 billion is from
shopping, four-fifths of which is from mercantile shopping, and one-fifth from non-mercantile
shopping.
Total Shopping Savings from Mercantile and Non-Mercantile Markets
2011-2015 (millions of dollars)
Year
Mercantile
Non-Mercantile
Total
2011
$391.60
$105.1
$496.70
2012
$324.69
$118.6
$443.29
2013
$600.81
$143.3
$744.11
2014
$664.21
$160.0
$824.21
2015
$487.19
$157.8
$645.19
Total
$2,468.50
$684.80
$3,153.30
In addition to shopping savings, an additional $12 billion was saved by Ohio’s ratepayers between
2011-2015 as a result of using deregulation strategies to establish the Standard Service Offer
(Price to Compare). These savings inured to all customers of the IOUs, regardless of whether they
shopped or not.
Total savings due to deregulation were around $3 billion per year between 2011 and 2015.
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Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Total

Total Savings Due to Deregulation in Ohio
2011-2015 (millions of dollars)
Shopping
SSO
$496.70
$2,395.00
$443.29
$2,366.00
$744.11
$2,342.00
$824.21
$2,380.00
$645.19
$2,339.00
$3,153.30
$11,822.00

Total
$2,891.70
$2,809.29
$3,086.11
$3,204.21
$2,984.19
$14,975.30

Ohio has also seen significant price drops in the standard service offers since utilities transitioned
to setting 100% of the Price to Compare by auction (as opposed to the cost-based accounting
historically used by regulators to set prices). As these standard service auctions mature, we might
expect that the available “headroom” (the difference between the price to compare and the price
that commercial retail providers can offer) will be diminished as markets work their way toward
equilibrium pricing. Accordingly, shopping savings in Ohio may not increase significantly going
forward, as the standard service auction process fully matures. In 2015 shoppers saved around
$645 million off of the SSO. We assumed that 2015 savings represent the savings available from
a mature auction market. Accordingly, we forecast additional savings from deregulation over the
next five years by adding this amount to the savings generated through the SSO auctions.
Using the $645 million per year savings, along with the PUCO’s long-term projections for electricity
consumption to forecast savings due to the standard service offer auctions, the Study Team
forecasts that Ohio’s ratepayers will save around $2.98 billion per year for the next five years from
deregulation, totaling $14.9 billion. Projected savings, compared to a reregulated generation
market, for 2016-2020 are as follows:

Year
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Total

Total Projected Savings Due to Deregulation in Ohio,
2016-2020 (millions of dollars)
Shopping Savings
SSO Auction Savings
$645
$2,333
$645
$2,338
$645
$2,343
$645
$2,349
$645
$2,354
$3,225
$11,717

Total Savings
$2,844
$2,829
$2,833
$2,839
$2,844
$14,942

Unfortunately, the regulated portion of electricity – called “non-bypassable costs” (distribution,
transmission, and various riders) – have been trending upwards at the same time that competition
in the generating market has been pushing the generation portion of the costs down. As a result,
the overall cost of electricity has not fully reflected the savings achieved through deregulation.

Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University

3

Electricity Consumer Choice in Ohio

However, reregulating the generation portion of electricity will not reverse the rising costs of
distribution and other non-bypassable charges. This only makes the argument for deregulation
more compelling, since deregulation is largely responsible for the relatively low cost of electricity
in Ohio. There exists no public policy basis for reregulating generation in Ohio.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Since the late 1990s, some 14 U.S. jurisdictions1 have restructured their electricity regulations to
allow for the existence of competitive, multi-state markets for electricity generation. Other states,
like Michigan, have allowed limited competition. Many states, including Ohio, have allowed open
competition in the generating market, but have created a partially regulated default alternative
for those customers who choose not to directly shop for their electricity. In these states, as in all
jurisdictions, certain other components of the cost of delivering electricity to end-users has
remained largely regulated, notably transmission, distribution and non-bypassable riders.
The research contained in this Study demonstrates that Ohio consumers have realized significant
savings due to the deregulation of generation. The savings have been realized in part because
Ohio’s utilities have begun setting their electricity generation standard service offers through
competitive auctions, and in part because Ohio’s consumers have been able to shop for their
electricity loads. Further, these savings are in keeping with trends seen by other states that have
switched to competitive electricity generation.
This Study principally examined the costs that have been avoided by Ohio’s electricity users as a
result of competition. The conclusion reached is that deregulation has, at a minimum, directly
saved Ohio consumers $14.98 billion between 2011 and 2015, and will likely save Ohio consumers
another $14.18 billion over the next five years (including 2016).
However, deregulating the market for electricity generation has triggered five major structural
changes that have negatively affected the financial condition of some of the incumbent utilities
by fundamentally disrupting their business model. These changes are:
1) The establishment of multi-state Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) that are
responsible for regulating the energy generating and transmission markets;
2) Shift in some of the responsibility over the reliability of the supply of electricity from state
regulatory bodies to the RTOs;
3) Flattening of demand for electricity. Demand initially dropped with the Great Recession
of 2008 and did not recover its previous growth rates, despite the subsequent economic
recovery, as energy efficiency and load management technologies became widely
deployed. The close correlation between economic growth and the demand for electricity
that existed before the Great Recession ended;
4) Perfection and dissemination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technologies
opened up massive and inexpensive natural gas deposits in the Appalachian Basin as a
competitive fuel source for electric generation, making both coal and nuclear generation
higher cost fuels for base-load electric generation;
1

The 14 deregulated jurisdictions are: CT, DC, DE, IL, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, OH, PA, RI, and TX. A map of the
regulated and deregulated states is attached hereto as Appendix 1.
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5) Private equity support for the entry of new lower-cost suppliers into the electricity
generating market. These new entrants are responding to market opportunities in baseload generation using natural gas and to consumer and regulatory demand for carbon-free
power generation.
Today a single, vertically integrated, market for electricity consumption does not exist and trying
to regulate the market as if all components of electricity are natural monopolies is not
economically viable. Barriers to entry into the electricity generation market have crumbled. There
is a regulated market for transmission from generating plants to distribution networks where
barriers to entry are declining, and auction markets managed by the RTOs are allocating capacity
based on demand. The local distribution networks are the last pure natural monopoly in the
electricity industry.
It is best to view the electricity market as consisting of three, separate, but closely integrated
submarkets: generation, transmission, and distribution. Regulation of generation and system
reliability is clearly the province of the RTOs and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC). The states retain an important watchdog role when it comes to assuring the reliability of
generating resources available to their residents and businesses. Interstate transmission capacity
is an RTO responsibility, and intrastate transmission capacity regulation belongs to the states
unless it negatively affects the interstate grid. This places state regulators in a subordinate position
on that issue. The distribution market, including the wires and infrastructure that connect homes
and places of work to power, remains (for the time being) a natural monopoly that is subject to
state regulation.
Changes in the regulatory and financial landscape have placed the formerly vertically integrated
utilities in an awkward position. Some bet heavily on coal-fired generation as the cheapest source
of base load electricity. In so doing, they stretched their financial capacities to purchase what
they thought were sure wins. The PUCO recognized at the start of its deregulation of the
generation market that the formerly regulated monopolies might need to recover for some
stranded assets resulting from deregulation. Indeed, the PUCO did allow utilities to be
compensated by their distribution customers for generating assets that had become “stranded,”
or uncompetitive, as a result of deregulation.
By late 2015 deregulation had once again become controversial in Ohio as several of Ohio’s
investor-owned utilities (IOUs) sought additional price supports for their uncompetitive
generation facilities – despite the fact that in Ohio generation has been deregulated since 2001.
The utilities argued that price supports were necessary because, without them, major existing
generation facilities will be shut down, arguing that this will threaten grid reliability and increase
the volatility and cost of electricity paid by end-users in Ohio. In the spring of 2016, the agency
that regulates Ohio’s electric utilities, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO), agreed with
the utilities and granted their requests for price support.2 The supports the PUCO granted were
2

AEP Energy. (2016). PUCO approves AEP Ohio and First Energy PPA stipulation. Retrieved from:
http://www.aepenergy.com/puco-approves-aep-ohio-and-first-energy-ppa-stipulations/#.V9Aq04YrI2w
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to be funded through the creation and assessment of non-bypassable riders to pay for novel longterm power purchase agreements produced by non-competitive plants owned by the IOUs.
However, all ratepayers, regardless of whether they actually purchased power from that utility or
if they shopped for electricity on the competitive market, were required to pay for the power
generated by these plants. Some selected industrial customers received, under the PUCO ruling,
special price discounts and exemptions under a complicated rate structure, in what appeared to
be a return for having supported the proposed power purchase agreements.3
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), following a recent Supreme Court ruling on a
similar generation subsidy scheme in Maryland, subsequently found that the PUCO decision
mandating support by Ohio consumers for certain high-cost generating assets though power
purchase agreements undermined regional wholesale electricity markets and violated federal
rules.4 As a result, rather than acknowledge that technology, regulation and markets have
changed over the decades, and retire their uncompetitive generation capacity, some of Ohio’s
utilities have instead turned their attention to identifying alternative strategies for offsetting the
costs of the uncompetitive portions of their generation fleet.
One such strategy is for Ohio to return to full, vertical regulation of the electricity industry.5 Under
this scenario, the utilities would reestablish spatial monopolies within their service areas, remonopolizing the traditional electric generating market and pre-monopolizing the emerging
market for distributed and carbon-free electricity generation. Under such a reregulation strategy,
utilities would be guaranteed their costs of service plus a return on their investment that is
negotiated with the PUCO, but is usually around 10 percent or higher.
The results from this Study suggest such a reregulation would have a significant adverse economic
impact on Ohio’s electricity consumers. The Study results show that deregulation has saved and
will continue to save Ohio ratepayers billions of dollars. Moreover, it is important to note that
competition in the generating market has not only lowered prices, it has also improved system
reliability,6 stimulated technical innovation, and has resulted in capital investment and
entrepreneurship. The economic development benefits from a deregulated generating market
appear in the form of operating costs savings for employers, new sources of construction

3

See e.g. Thomas, A. (2015) “FirstEnergy’s Latest Strategy for a Bailout is Still a Bad Idea.” Crain’s Cleveland
Business (explaining FirstEnergy’s redistributive coalition strategy). Retrieved from:
http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20150123/BLOGS05/150129906/firstenergys-latest-strategy-for-a-bailoutis-still-a-bad-idea.
4
Funk, J. (2016) FERC reject PUCO-approved FirstEnergy, AEP power deals. Retrieved from:
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2016/04/ferc_rejects_puco_approval_of.html
5
Funk, J. (2015). FirstEnergy wants Ohio to end deregulation, return to state-controlled rates. Retrieved from:
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2015/07/firstenergy_wants_ohio_to_end.html
6
For example, total capacity reserves in the PJM have been increasing since deregulation. A higher reserve capacity
leads to a more reliable system. See “2019/2020 RPM Base Residual Auction Results,” PJM (2016), retrieved from:
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2019-2020-base-residual-auctionreport.ashx
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employment as new generation plants are built, and improved regional competitiveness as the
relative price of electricity has declined.
Deregulation has also played a role in reducing consumption. Historically electricity consumption
in the U.S. has been directly tied to economic growth. In the United States, this relationship
changed during the recovery from the Great Recession of 2008 when electricity consumption
decoupled from economic growth for the first time.7 In Ohio, electricity consumption has been
flat since 2008, notwithstanding a slow but steady recovery since then.8 This coincides with
changes in Ohio laws that furthered deregulation. Many of the programs that have developed as
a result of deregulation, such as demand response and load management, have contributed to
this decoupling.
The effects of the decoupling have not been measured in this Study, even though it has led to
lower electricity costs, technical innovation, and investment into new generation capacity in Ohio.
Instead, this Study looks only at the direct savings attributable to generation suppliers competing
for customers that were ushered in through deregulation of electricity in Ohio.

B. ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND COMPETITION
A prolonged bout of financial turmoil that challenged the stability and structure of the electricity
industry began with the 1973 Arab Oil embargo. The embargo triggered an 18-month recession
in the United States that reduced industrial demand and increased operating costs as fuel prices
shot up.9 Change accelerated when Consolidated Edison froze its dividend in 1974 and the value
of utility stocks collapsed. Utilities were no longer considered a steady rate return “widows and
orphans” stock and a safe alternative to bonds for risk-averse investors. Financial troubles
haunted the industry through the 1970s as political instability in the Middle East followed the Iran
revolution of 1978. Political-economical shocks that made it difficult to predict the cost of fuel,
coupled with the changing assessment of risk from investing in the industry, posed a threat to the
stability of electricity supplies in the United States. In response, the United States Congress
enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) of 1978. The ideas of PURPA were to
promote energy conservation, to stimulate greater use of domestic and renewable energy, and to
increase efficiency within the generation sector.
The prospect of private market competition in electricity dawned in 1992, with the passage of the
Energy Policy Act. This Act was fundamental to setting the U.S. down a path toward improving
7

Romm, J. (2016) U.S. economic growth decouples from both energy and electricity use. Retrieved from:
https://thinkprogress.org/u-s-economic-growth-decouples-from-both-energy-and-electricity-use16ae78732e59#.wy153assg
8
U.S. Energy Information Administration (2016). Ohio electricity profile 2014. Retrieved from:
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/ohio/
9
Oil and gas prices both increased rapidly in the 1970s. The Arab oil embargo merely precipitated this rapid rise in
costs, however; other factors were involved in the escalating hydrocarbon prices during the 1970s. Other factors
included reserve overestimates, drilling and production costs increases and the dedication of gas reservoirs to lowpriced contracts on interstate gas pipelines.
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efficiency in the electric system by introducing competition into electricity generation. It led to a
new class of privately owned and operated electricity generation service providers that were
allowed to compete for the right to generate and sell electric power. Congress mandated that
utilities provide wholesale power transmission services to these providers at cost-based rates,
even if doing so might cause them to expand their transmission capacity. 10 This Congressional
mandate created demand for a transmission line capacity market and ultimately for a wholesale
electricity market.
In 1996, the FERC responded by issuing Order 888, which required utilities to provide “open access
non-discriminatory transmission services” to independent generators. This separated generation
capacity in power plants from transmission and distribution services, thus breaking apart the
historical vertical integration of electric utilities. FERC assumed responsibility for both regulation
of the interstate transmission of electricity and the rules governing wholesale power generation
competition, while the States remained responsible for intrastate regulation.
Not long after this, some states began to deregulate electric power generation services with the
goal of creating a competitive market for generation. Deregulation allowed generators to sell
power directly to end-users and to intermediary firms that aggregated the demand of electricity
users and purchased generating capacity for them. In deregulated states, wholesale power
generation service providers could compete with each other to sell electricity to consumers who,
all else being equal, would buy it at the lowest possible price. The creation of competitive
wholesale markets also allowed investors to bring on-line new sources of generating capacity that
could compete in terms of purchase price and, eventually, also in terms of their carbon and other
emissions.
The main purpose of electricity deregulation was to use competition to promote operational
efficiencies resulting in lower prices.11 This, of course, raises the question as to whether or not
this expectation was fulfilled. Published research makes clear that many factors have to be
considered in answering this question, and while the findings are somewhat mixed, there is a
consensus that deregulation has resulted in reduced prices.
States that have historically paid the highest electricity prices have tended to be the states that
have chosen to deregulate their markets.12 Ardoin and Grady (2006) established that the price of
electricity per kWh was likely to play a significant role in a state’s decision to deregulate. Their
finding is consistent with the findings documented in this study.
As of 2016, there are 14 competitive regulatory jurisdictions in the United States: Delaware,
District of Columbia, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and the area of Texas that is within the ERCOT
10

Ardoin, P.J., & Grady, D. (2006). The Politics of Electricity Restructuring across the American States: Power Failure
and Policy Failure. State & Local Government Review, 165-175
11
P. Joskow. (2006). Markets for Power in the United States: An Interim Assessment. The Energy Journal, 27, 1 – 36
12
Ardoin & Grady, supra, note 10.
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regional transmission organization. Together, these jurisdictions comprise about one-third of the
U.S. electricity load.13 The remaining states continue to regulate their electric utilities as either a
vertically integrated monopoly that links generation, transmission and distribution, or under a
model that allows for highly restricted access to competitive electricity markets as is true in
Michigan.14

II. HISTORY OF DEREGULATION IN OHIO
A. ELECTRICITY IN OHIO PRIOR TO RESTRUCTURING
Before the passage of Senate Bill 315 in 1999 (and the subsequent enactment of the law in January
2001), Ohio’s electricity utilities were regulated by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio under
the traditional approach to regulation: transmission, distribution and generation were bundled
together in a package by the local utility.16 Under this model, a restricted geographic market
became a “certified territory”17 wherein the utility was granted monopoly rights to18 provide a
bundled package of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution, subject to regulatory
oversight by the PUCO.
Prior to 2001, there were eight for-profit public utilities and 26 non-profit electric utilities in Ohio,
all of which provided bundled retail electric service to customers within their respective certified
territories. About 91 percent of the electricity consumed in Ohio was provided by the eight forprofit, investor-owned utilities (IOUs).19 Four of these IOUs, with their respective operating
companies – AEP Ohio (Columbus Southern and Ohio Power), Dayton Power & Light, Duke Energy,
and FirstEnergy (Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Toledo Edison and Ohio Edison),
generated and supplied most of the electricity consumed in Ohio.20
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Kuipers, W. & Chappelle, L . (2016). Electricity Customer Choice Out-Performs Traditional Monopoly. Utility Dive,
retrieved from: http://www.utilitydive.com/news/electricity-customer-choice-out-performs-traditional-monopoly1/424986/
14
For a map of the regulated and deregulated jurisdictions, see Appendix “1” attached hereto.
15
Senate Bill 3 was introduced to Ohio’s 123rd General Assembly on January 20, 1999, to enact Ohio Revised Code,
section 4928.01. Through the Senate and House actions it was substituted and amended several times, and finally
passed by General Assembly and signed by Governor on July 6, 1999 as Am. Sub. S.B.3.
16
Ohio Public Utilities Commission Docket, Case No. 12-3151-EL-COI, entry of Commission’s findings setting forth
investigation into Ohio’s retail market, at 1 (December 12, 2012); found at:
http://dis.puc.state.oh.us/TiffToPDf/A1001001A12L12B14210G58737.pdf
17
Ohio Code, Title 49. XLIX Public Utilities, Chapter 4933: Companies – Gas; Electric; Water; Others, 4933.81.
Certified territories for electric suppliers definition: http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/4933.
18
Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Final Analysis. Am. Sub. S.B. 3 (Ohio Legislative Service Commission, 1999).
19
The IOU portion of the Ohio total load can be determined by comparing the total load in 2015 (145,5000,000
MWhs) to the total IOU load in 2015 (132,922,251 MWhs). See Report by the Staff of the PUCO – Ohio Long Term
Forecast of Energy Requirements, July 22, 2015, page 41, found at:
http://www.puco.ohio.gov/puco/index.cfm/industry-information/statistical-reports/ohio-long-term-energyforecast/ohio-ltfr-2014-2033/ and at http://www.puco.ohio.gov/puco/index.cfm/industry-information/statisticalreports/electric-customer-choice-switch-rates-and-aggregation-activity/electric-switch-rates-by-sales/sales-2015
20
Snitchler, T. “The Emerging Ohio Market,” presented at 21st Century Manufacturing Task Force (November 26,
2012). “IOUs” and “EDUs” are often used interchangeably, but the restructuring of the electricity markets brought
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Under Ohio’s electricity regulation regime that existed prior to 2001 the IOUs were required to
petition the PUCO for approval of their electric rates. Approved electricity rates included the cost
of operation reported by the utilities, typically accounting for 80 percent of the utilities’ revenue,
plus a rate of return on that part of the utilities’ capital investment that was determined to be
“used and useful” in all three phases of the business—generation, transmission, and
distribution.21 Under this traditional method of determining the electricity rate, consumers bore
the risk of all operations, from generation to transmission to distribution, so long as those
operations were deemed to be “useful” to the process of delivering power to the consumers. The
determination of “usefulness” was made by the PUCO on the basis of information provided to
them by the utilities, thus raising issues and potential problems associated with information
asymmetries and regulatory capture. However, the return on capital investment portion of the
electricity rate could only include those investments made into infrastructure currently in use by
utilities for electricity generation and delivery.
Like a number of states in the Northeast and the Upper Midwest, electricity rates in Ohio began
to rise in the 1990s. Further, prices were considerably higher in Ohio than in some competing
states, especially those in the Southeastern portion of the nation, where lower electricity prices
invited continued migration of manufacturing investment out of Ohio. Higher prices in Ohio were
largely attributable to factors such as the fuel mix used for generation within the state, fuel prices,
real yield on utility debt, as well as the age and condition of the electric transmission and
distribution grid.22 Northern Ohio consumers, especially, experienced high prices that can be
attributed to the pass-through of nuclear power cost overruns.23

B. RESTRUCTURING OF ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND SENATE BILL 3
Since the late 1990s 24 states, including Ohio, restructured their electric power markets. The Ohio
Electric Restructuring Act (SB 3) in 1999 authorized the 2001 deregulation of the electric power
industry by encouraging the development of a competitive market for electric power generation
in Ohio.
The restructuring required electric utilities to separate or “unbundle” their services and charges
for electricity generation, transmission, and distribution and to allow retail customers to choose
their electric retail suppliers.24 Under SB 3, competitive retail services included electric
generation, aggregation, power marketing and brokering. Additionally, metering, billing, and
collection services could be performed as part of providing competitive retail services. However,
about a clearer distinction. EDUs are generally in the business of electricity distribution, while the IOUs are in the
business of electricity more generally.
21
Shapiro, S. & Tomain, J. (2003) Regulatory Law and Policy: Cases and Materials (3), 109
22
Joskow, P. (2006). Markets for Power in the United States: An Interim Assessment. The Energy Journal (27), 1 –
36.
23
See e.g. Kiesling, L.L. (2009). Deregulation, Innovation and Market Liberalization: Electricity Regulation in a
Continually Evolving Environment. Rutledge Studies in Business Organizations and Networks, 24-25.
24
Ohio Public Utilities Commission Docket, Case No. 12-3151-EL-COI, supra, at 1. The utilities received
consideration for separating. For instance, FirstEnergy received $7 billion for “stranded costs” associated with the
transition. http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/ohio.html.
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SB 3 ensured that the IOUs retained their spatial monopoly status for electric transmission and
distribution services within their respective regions – meaning that intrastate transmission and
retail distribution remained under the PUCO’s regulatory authority under a cost-based (cost plus
a rate of return, or “cost plus”) regulatory scheme.25
Beginning on January 1, 2001, SB 3 enabled electricity customers to have the choice of competitive
retail service providers for their electric energy. The Senate bill also established a market
development period through December 31, 2005, which was designed to serve as a transition
period from regulated to deregulated electric generating markets. During this development
period, the IOUs submitted “Electric Transition Plans,”26 to the PUCO. At that point then-current
electric rates were frozen pending the development of a competitive wholesale market.
It is also important to note what SB 3 did not require. The IOUs were not required to sell their
electric generation assets to third parties. Further, while they were required to place their
generation assets into separately operated subsidiaries, the statute did no set dates by when
separation needed to be completed. Further, the PUCO did not seek to enforce full separation
immediately. Such a separation would have isolated the competitive portion of an IOU
(generation) from the regulated portions of the companies (intrastate transmission and
distribution) and made cross-subsidization from one to the other more difficult. Only FirstEnergy
immediately separated its generating plants into a wholly owned subsidiary. The PUCO did not
order AEP Ohio to do so until 2013, while by the fall of 2016, DP&L had still not separated.27
Competitive electricity markets failed to emerge during the 2000s, as no competitive retail electric
service (CRES) providers were bidding on loads under these conditions.28
In an attempt to lower barriers to the market to provide electricity to customers, the PUCO,
together with Ohio’s electric utilities, established plans to minimize market uncertainty and to
provide customers a gradual transition to market-based rates with stable and predictable rates.
This “Rate Stabilization Period” took place for FirstEnergy, Duke Energy Ohio, Dayton Power and
Light, and American Electric Power from 2006 through 2008.29 However, these rate stabilization
plans did not result in competitive electricity markets. Even the government aggregation programs
– described by one author as the “jewel of deregulation” – were not working.30 In northeast Ohio,
25

Ohio Legislative Service Commission, supra. For instance, PUCO approved a 9.46 percent rate of return for Duke
Energy on November 22, 2010 (p.41, PUCO, 2013). For each of FirstEnergy’s operating companies, PUCO approved an
8.48 percent return rate.
26
Littlechild, S. (2007) Municipal Aggregation and Retail Aggregation in the Ohio Sector. Retrieved from:
http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/eprg0715.pdf.
27
See “AEP Receives All Necessary Approvals to Complete Separation of its Ohio Assets,” December 26, 2013,
retrieved from: http://www.aep.com/newsroom/newsreleases/?ID=1851. As of November 2016, only DP&L has
not separated. It was ordered to do so by January 1, 2017, however DP&L has argued that its electric security plan
approved by the PUCO was vacated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, therefore the order to do so was
also vacated. See http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2016/2016-Ohio-7535.pdf
28
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. (2007) Electric Rate Stabilization Plans: Ensuring Rate Certainty in Ohio.
Retrieved from: http://www.getpurenergy.com/states/forms/Electric%20Rate%20Stabilization.pdf.
29
Id. See Figure 1 for specific dates for each IOU.
30
Littlechild. Municipal Aggregation 3, supra (quoting Ohio Consumer’s Counsel).
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residential users were essentially paying standard service offer rates from the IOUs, which were
the retail electric rates established by the PUCO after engaging in traditional regulatory bargaining
with each utility.31 By 2007, then-Governor Ted Strickland determined that deregulation in Ohio
“was not working.”32 As a result, the Governor presented a new strategy to help develop
electricity markets to the Ohio General Assembly.
It is important to remember that Ohio’s electricity industry is only partially deregulated. The
intent of SB 3 was not to fully deregulate Ohio’s electricity industry. Ohio’s approach to electricity
deregulation has recognized that the changes in federal regulation and the creation of multi-state
regional transmission organizations produced a multi-state competitive market for electricity
generation and a partially regulated market for interstate electricity transmission. The state’s
intent was to deregulate the electricity generation portion of the service while maintaining
regulation on intrastate transmission and distribution.
Deregulation of the generation market allows users of large volumes of electricity to purchase
power directly from generating companies and have that power delivered through the multistate,
regional, transmission grid. Smaller users were expected to purchase their power from a
competitive group of companies that would aggregate electricity users and purchase power on
their behalf. These “aggregators” were envisioned to be either traditional electric utilities (IOUs,
municipal utilities, or cooperatives), municipalities or groups of municipalities, and competitive
providers that were expected to enter the retail market.
When SB 3 unbundled the services and charges of electric utilities, it effectively unbundled the
electric user’s electric bill. Understanding this unbundling is required to recognize what portion of
an electric bill became competitive and what portions remain subject to regulation. An electric
bill in partially deregulated Ohio states the cost of generation that is part of a service offer, and
then separately provides the costs of transmission, distribution, and various riders or quasi-taxes
that the PUCO assesses to specific electric ratepayers to support industrial discounts given to
promote economic development, weatherization, and other redistributive actions that are under
the review of the PUCO.

C. TAKE TWO: SENATE BILL 221 AND REVISIONS TO RESTRUCTURING
In August 2007, then-Governor Strickland announced a new energy plan, entitled “Energy, Jobs,
and Progress Plan.” The Governor’s energy proposal included four major goals: (1) stable and
predictable electricity rates, (2) the development of advanced and renewable energy
technologies, (3) an increase of energy efficiency, and (4) the modernization of Ohio’s electric
infrastructure. Ohio’ General Assembly passed Senate Bill 221 in May 2008 largely incorporating
the Governor’s proposal (SB 221 passed the Ohio Senate 32-0 and the Ohio House on a 93-1 vote).
The plan was most notable for its enactment of a renewable energy portfolio, as well as energy
efficiency mandates. However, the plan also revisited and revised Ohio’s strategies for
restructuring the electricity generating market. SB 221 changed the regulatory framework for all
31
32

Id.
Id.
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utilities engaged in the retail distribution of electric power, which includes the power delivered
through their subsidiary electric distribution utilities (EDUs).33
SB 221 required Ohio’s electric utilities to implement a “hybrid approach” to setting electric rates
for default service (i.e. when a customer does not actively choose an alternative retail supplier).34
Instead of fully relying on the competitive market approach for this default service, SB 221
requires each of Ohio’s EDUs to develop a standard service offer (SSO) for its retail service within
a certified distribution territory.35 SB 221 redefined a utility’s SSO as “an offer of all competitive
retail electric services necessary to maintain essential electric service to consumers, including a
firm supply of electric generation service, and be offered on a comparable and nondiscriminatory
basis.”36
The SSO, under the SB 221, must be set either as part of an electric security plan (ESP)37 or through
a market rate offer (MRO).38 The ESP is a traditional rate plan based on a cost-of-service proposal
from the electric utilities (which can include a blend of electricity that is from the utility’s captive
generating capacity and purchased power). The MRO is a market-based pricing system that sets
retail rates through a competitive bidding process where the EDU seeks bids from wholesale
suppliers of power. To stabilize electricity prices, SB 221 authorized the PUCO to establish rules
and test utilities’ rate plans to determine whether the plans were “fair and equitable” to
consumers, and to determine if utilities were generating excessive earnings from their rates.
While SB 221 preserved SB 3’s requirement that the SSO from each utility be the default service
for its customers, the bill amended the PUCO’s approval process and enabled the EDUs to choose
either the rate set in the ESP or the MRO to establish the generation portion of the SSO (the “Price
to Compare,” or PTC). To date, only ESPs have been used and filed with the PUCO by Ohio’s
utilities. However, the ESPs have included aspects of the market rate option by using marketbased supply auctions to establish the cost of generation under the SSO.
It is important to note that SB 221 provided the utilities with an important concession: it allowed
their EDUs to place “riders” into their non-bypassable costs through the ESPs. Riders are
33

SB221 changed the regulatory framework that applies to EDUs. An electric utility was defined as “an electric light
company that has a certified territory and is engaged on a for-profit basis either in the business of supplying
noncompetitive retail electric service in this state or in the business of supplying both a noncompetitive and a
competitive retail electric services in this state.” SB 221 further defined an EDU as “an electric utility that supplies
at least retail electric distribution service.” See Thompson Hines: PUCO Finalizes SB 221 Electricity Pricing Rules,
Energy Update (October 2008); http://www.thompsonhine.com/publications/energy-update-puco-finalizes-sb-221electricity-pricing-rules.
34
Caplan, E. & Brobeck, S.(2012), Have Restructured Wholesale Electricity Markets Benefitted Consumers?
Electricity Policy.com. Retrieved from:
https://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/CFA_APPA_RTO_Article_12_12_12.pdf
35
The term “Standard Service Offer” is also called the “Provider of Last Resort” offer – in other words the default
service when the consumer fails to choose a provider. EPSA Electricity Primer at 4. www.esps.org.
36
Legislative Service Commission. (2008). Am. Sub. SB 221.,13. Retrieved from:
http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/analyses127/08-sb221-127.pdf
37
Ohio Rev. Code Section 4928.143. See http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/4928.
38
Ohio Rev. Code Section 4928.142.
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additional charges imposed by the utilities to reimburse them for costs they incur in providing
distribution services or to pay for social programs. Some, such as compliance with energy
efficiency mandates, are non-bypassable. As a result, SB 221 effectively invites utilities to try to
make up losses incurred from competition by expanding their non-bypassable riders. The utilities
predictably deploy many riders. FirstEnergy’s EDU Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI),
for instance, has some 41 non-bypassable riders, of which as many as 35 are applicable depending
upon the rate class of a customer.39 The most troubling are the “automatic adjustment” riders –
those that can go up each year with no regulatory review. The concern is that utilities may use
increases in these riders to capture some of the losses attributable to competition in the
generation markets, offsetting savings otherwise available for consumers.
At this same time, the PUCO also furthered the deregulation process by requiring corporate
separation of non-competitive retail electric service (distribution) from competitive electric
service.40 As of August 2016, there are seven regulated EDUs (excluding transmission subsidiaries)
that are operating in Ohio:41








Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (FirstEnergy)
Ohio Edison (FirstEnergy)
Toledo Edison (FirstEnergy)
Columbus Southern Power (American Electric Power)
Ohio Power Company (American Electric Power)
AES Corporation (Also known as Dayton Power & Light)
Duke Energy Ohio

Figure 1 sets forth the time line of the key regulatory decisions in Ohio made since deregulation
was initially passed in 1999. The medium shaded region represents the time-period after SB 221
was passed, which is the period when Ohio first began to attract commercial retail electricity
service companies into its electricity markets. The darker shade represents the period after which
the rate stabilization period ended, and when the deregulated markets began in earnest.

39

FirstEnergy Tariff Sheets 2016 (sheet 80). Residential consumers have 33 non-bypassable riders in CEI’s service
territory.
40
PUCO Case Number 12-3151-EL-COI, Entry Order from PUCO, dated 12/12/2012 at 1.
41
See e.g. “The Players in the Ohio Energy Market.” Direct Energy. Retrieved from:
https://www.directenergy.com/learning-center/energy-choice/ohio-players-electric-market. See also:
http://www.puco.ohio.gov/puco/index.cfm/docketing/regulated-company-list/?IndId=25
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Figure 1. Ohio Electric Market Restructuring Process

Source: Noah Dormady, et al, Ohio State University (2016)

D. OHIO’S COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE SINCE 2009
Nearly all of the electricity consumed in Ohio from the start of deregulation in 2001 through 2008
was provided by IOUs and their market affiliates—the EDUs. Attracting competitive retail
electricity providers to bid on providing power to end users in Ohio was, and continues to be,
critical to the success of injecting competitive market forces into the state’s economy.42 Since
2009 Ohio has been successful in attracting a number of significant CRES providers. FirstEnergy
Solutions continues to be the largest CRES provider in Ohio; however, as can be seen by the
following table, its market share has dropped considerably from 2011 to 2015:

42

The PUCO recognizes two types of competitive retail electric service (CRES) providers: (1) competitive retail
electric suppliers, and (2) government aggregators. As of August 2016, there were 1141 electric providers
registered in Ohio, of which 342 were government aggregators, and 799 were competitive retail electric suppliers
(CRES) providers. The PUCO also recognizes multiple forms of CRES providers, including brokers/nongovernment
aggregators, generators, and marketers. See Public Utility Commission of Ohio at:
http://www.puco.ohio.gov/puco/index.cfm/docketing/regulated-company-list/. Many CRES providers list
themselves in multiple categories, making it appear that are more registered CRES providers than there actually are.
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Table 1. Sale Amount Generated by Commercial Electric Suppliers (MWH)
MWH
2011
2013
2015
FirstEnergy Solutions
41,223,219
49,437,270
27,160,820
Corp
AEP Energy
1,513,656
7,554,206
9,390,908
Others
21,308,010
34,452,631
60,049,598
43
Total
64,044,885
91,444,107
96,601,326
Percent Change
2011-2013
2013-2015
FirstEnergy Solutions
19.9%
-45.1%
Corp
AEP Energy
399.1%
24.3%
Others
61.7%
74.3%
Total
42.8%
5.6%
Source: PUCO Annual Reports44

Major CRES providers (as opposed to Ohio IOUs) have made considerable market gains since 2011.
Direct Energy, in particular, had achieved a 14 percent share of the electricity shopping market.
Other non-incumbent companies that were able to obtain at least 5 percent of market share in
Ohio between 2013 and 2015 include Noble Americas, GDF Suez (now Engie) and Constellation.
Since 2008 the amount of retail electricity shopping has also seen a marked increase. As seen in
Figure 2, over the last eight years the percentage of energy that is sold through shopping has
grown from an average of 9.13% to an average of 73.75%. Additional information on switching
rates can be found in Appendix 2.

43

Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. (2016) Summary of switch rates from EDU to CRES providers in terms of sales.
Retrieved from: http://www.puco.ohio.gov/puco/index.cfm/industry-information/statistical-reports/electriccustomer-choice-switch-rates-and-aggregation-activity/electric-switch-rates-by-sales/sales-2q2016/
44
PUCO Annual Reports, 2011-2015. Other CRES providers include, but are not limited to, Duke Energy Retail, Dynegy,
Dayton Power & Light Energy Resources, Constellation New Energy Inc., Champion Energy Services, Noble Americas
Energy Solutions LLC, Direct Energy Services LLC, MP2 Energy, MidAmerican Energy and GDF Suez Energy Solutions
LLC.
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Figure 2. Percentage of Ohio Energy Sold to Shoppers, 2008-2016
AEP
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Source: PUCO (2016)45

E. STANDARD SERVICE OFFERS
Standard Service Offers in Ohio have been set by a mixture of cost-based and auction-based
accounting practices. By the fall of 2016, however, all of the utilities in Ohio had transitioned to
using 100 percent auction-based accounting to determine their SSO prices. FirstEnergy has been
using auctions to determine the SSO price since 2009. In 2012 Duke transitioned to 100 percent
auction, and in 2015 AEP also transitioned to 100 percent auction. DP&L transitioned to a 100
percent auction in January 2014.
Electricity consumers in Ohio can use the “Price to Compare” in selecting their electricity supplier.
To electricity users, the PTC represents that portion of the cost of electricity that consumers can
avoid by selecting an offer other than the SSO from the traditional utility (this selection process is
called “shopping”). CRES providers think of the PTC as the price that they have to beat to win
business and to gain market share. The terms “PTC” and “SSO” are used interchangeably in the
electricity business.
The SSO auctions are conducted in compliance with electric stability plans approved by the PUCO.
Typically they are undertaken in tranches, with each tranche representing a target purchase of
electricity 12, 24 and 36 months in advance of delivery.46 The electricity generating companies
that sell power at these auctions are usually obligated to supply whatever volume of electricity
may be required to fulfill their pro-rata share of the tranche. In the recent auction conducted by
45

Id.
FirstEnergy (2016). FirstEnergy Ohio Utilities’ CBP SSO Auctions. Retrieved from:
http://www.firstenergycbp.com/FAQ.aspx
46
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FirstEnergy, the auction cleared at $48.46, $49.36 and $50.49 per MWh for the 1, 2 and 3-year
products.47
Auction bids contain more than the cost of generating the required power: they also include
capacity costs, which have become an increasingly large part of the Price to Compare. For a typical
24-month bid into an SSO auction, energy and capacity together comprise 88 percent of the total
bid. An example of the breakdown of the build out for a competitive supplier bidding on an
auction is in Table 2:
Table 2. Supplier Cost Build Out Example for SSO Auction
24-Month
Energy

61%

Capacity

27%

Risks, Additional Costs, and Margin

12%
100%

Source: Industry Interviews (2016)48

An analysis of how the SSOs were affected by the change from cost-plus accounting to auctions is
presented in Section IV, infra. It is important for consumers to remember, however, that even if
they choose to not shop and to accept the PTC, this is still only a portion of the total cost of
electricity that is reflected in the bills they receive. Distribution, transmission and non-bypassable
riders comprise nearly a third of the total cost (see Figure 4 below in Section IV, infra.)

III. LITERATURE REVIEW
In addition to Ardoin and Grady, a number of researchers have sought to understand if
deregulation of electricity has reduced costs. The bulk of the peer-reviewed research indicates
that deregulation reduces electricity prices. Joskow (2006) examined the impacts of wholesale
and retail market reforms on average retail residential and industrial price in different states using
data from 1970 to 2003 and from 1981 to 2003 and found that competition has been associated
with lower retail prices overall, although less so for small customers.49 Su’s (2014) analysis of the
impact of deregulation on electricity price for the period from 1990 to 2011 concluded that
deregulation lead to a reduction in residential electricity prices, but that the reduction occurred

47

Kaften, C. (2016). Energy Manager Today. Retrieved from: http://www.energymanagertoday.com/puco-acceptsresults-of-firstenergy-auction-0123575/
48
Private communication with CRES providers and brokers. “Energy” as used here means the generation of
electricity. This is a common method that retail companies use to differentiate the cost of generation from the cost
of electricity, which term usually encompasses the entire cost, including distribution, transmission and other nonbypassable costs.
49
Joskow, P.L. (2006). Markets for Power in the United States: An Interim Assessment. AEI-Brookings Joint Center
Working Paper, 05-20.
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during the first five years after deregulation.50 Carlson and Loomis (2008) examined residential
electricity prices in five states (IL, IN, IA, KY, MO, and WI) between 1997 and 2007 and concluded
that both nominal and real electricity prices fell in deregulated states during the time-period
studied.51
Joskow (1997) also found that retail competition lowered both residential and industrial electricity
prices in Texas.52 Swadley and Yucel (2011) analyzed retail electricity prices in the residential
sector in 16 states (CA, CT, DE, IL, MA, MD, ME, MI, NH, NJ, NY, OH, PA, RI, TX, and VA) and the
District of Columbia, finding that retail competition lowered the markup of retail prices over
wholesale costs, and that deregulation generally appeared to lower prices more in states with a
higher proportion of customers participating in retail choice.53 Fabrizio et al. (2007) found
evidence of reduced fuel and nonfuel expenses in fossil-fueled plants in states that restructured
their wholesale markets to accommodate competition in electricity generating markets.54 Ros
(2016) found that competition in electricity markets was associated with lower electricity prices
with the mean total impact being price decreases of -4.2 percent, -8.5 percent and -11.6 percent
for residential, commercial, and industrial customers during the period 1972 to 2009.55
Another recent study ranked price increases between 2008-2015 for the 49 contiguous electricity
jurisdictions in the United States. In this study, Kuipers and Chappelle (2016) found that since the
recession of 2008, electricity customer choice has “routinely outperforming traditional
monopolies in terms of price.”56 By comparing “all-sector,” all-in prices between 2008 and 2015,
Kuipers and Chappelle found that “competitive choice states cluster toward the low end” of rate
increases. Further, half of the 14 choice states showed price decreases, while only 3 of 35
monopoly states showed a decrease.57 Ohio, according to Kuipers and Chappelle, was the weakest
performing among the deregulated states, with nearly a 20 percent average price increase:

50

Su, X. (2014). Have Customers Benefited from Electricity Retail Competition? Journal of Regulatory Economics,
47(2), 146-182.
51
Carlson, J.L., and Loomis, D., (2008) An Assessment of the Impact of Deregulation on the Relative Price of
Electricity in Illinois. The Electricity Journal, 21(6), 60-70.
52
Joskow, P.L., (1997. Restructuring Competition and Regulatory Reform in the US Electricity Sector. The Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 11(3), 119-138.
53
Swadley, A. and Yucel, M., (2007) Did Residential Electricity Rates Fall after Retail Competition? A Dynamic Panel
Analysis. Energy Policy, 39(12), 7702-7711. For this Study we used a different group of states, although they were
mostly the same. See Section I, supra, note 1. Michigan, for instance, was deregulated in 2006, but later reregulated, so was considered a regulated jurisdiction for this Study.
54
Fabrizio, Kira R., Rose, Nancy R., and Wolfram, Catherine D.(2007). Do Markets Reduce Cost? Assessing the Impact
of Regulatory Restructuring on U.S. Electric Generation Efficiency. The American Economic Review, 97(4), 12501277.
55
Ros, A. (2016). An Econometric Assessment of Electricity Demand in the United States Using Utility-Specific Panel
Data and the Impact of Retail Competition on Prices. The Energy Journal, 38(4).
56
Kuipers, W. & Chappelle, L . (2016). Electricity Customer Choice Out-Performs Traditional Monopoly. Utility Dive
retrieved from: http://www.utilitydive.com/news/electricity-customer-choice-out-performs-traditional-monopoly1/424986/
57
Id. This Study used the same 14 jurisdictions identified as deregulated by Kuipers & Chapelle.
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Figure 3. Comparison of Change in All-In Electricity Prices Between 2008 and 2015 in 49 US
Regulatory Jurisdictions

Source: Electricity Choice Now (2016)58

Kuipers and Chapelle argued that the reason why regulated states have performed poorly
compared to deregulated states is that “traditional monopoly needs to push consumer prices
higher as sales volumes stagnate. In contrast, in the Choice states, overall prices are suppressed
by flat demand.”59 It should be noted, however, that notwithstanding Ohio’s weaker overall
performance than other deregulated states, Ohio still outperformed Michigan and other
neighboring states that have not yet deregulated. This is especially true with West Virginia, which
had the worst performance of any of the 49 jurisdictions. Further, as will be explained in Section
IV, infra, the reasons for Ohio’s relatively weak performance relates to the regulated portion of the
consumer’s cost of electricity rather than the portion of the final bill that is associated with
deregulated generation costs.
In October of 2016, the Kleinman Center for Energy Policy at the University of Pennsylvania
published a study that demonstrated similar results to those found in the other studies identified
herein. The authors concluded that overall, the statewide average “all-sector retail price of
electricity in Pennsylvania was 0.1 percent below the national average, compared to 15 percent
above the national average before restructuring.”60 Using EIA data to determine the savings, the
58

Energy Choice Now. (2016). Retrieved from: http://ecnmichigan.com/
Id.
60
Hanger, J. & Simeone, C. (2016) A Case Study of Electric Competition Results in Pennsylvania. Kleinman Center for
Energy Policy, 24. Retrieved from:
http://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/proceedingsreports/A%20Case%20Study%20of%20Electric%2
0Competition%20Results%20in%20Pennsylvania_0.pdf
59
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authors further concluded that residential ratepayers in Pennsylvania saved around $819 million
in 2016 as a result of deregulation.61
On balance, the research literature establishes that deregulation tends to decrease overall
electricity prices, although exactly how, and to what extent, depends on specific market and
regulatory conditions that are extremely difficult to fully capture with highly aggregated statistical
models. Indeed, as will be seen from the following discussion, when the data are unbundled and
examined, it is apparent that Ohio’s consumers have benefited greatly from deregulation.
Further, this trend will likely continue, as long as utilities are regulated in a manner that prevents
them from making up the revenue they lose due to competition by increasing the charges they
can impose on the regulated side of the business.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION ON ELECTRICITY PRICES IN
OHIO
A. REGULATED AND DEREGULATED COMPONENTS OF ELECTRICITY PRICE
One of the challenges of analyzing the impact of deregulation comes from the complex
composition of electricity prices. The retail price that a consumer pays has multiple components
that are difficult to disentangle and understand. Compounding the difficulty is the fact that only
portions of the delivered cost of electricity have been deregulated. The major cost components
of the retail price of electricity for a typical commercial Ohio customer are presented in Figure 4
and described below:




Energy (deregulated). The energy charge refers to the actual cost of generating electricity
by the generating company. The industry commonly uses the term “energy” price to
describe this charge to differentiate it from the “electricity” price, which is used in the
industry to describe the “all in” retail price paid for by the consumer. This charge makes
up the single largest share of the total price. Purchases of electricity from generators
constituted 48 percent of the end user’s electric bill in 2015 (Figure 4).
Capacity (deregulated). The Regional Transmission Organization (RTO)62 that regulates
and manages Ohio’s electricity generation and interstate transmission markets is PJM
Interconnect. PJM states that the capacity market is designed to “meet the demand for
the future.”63 Its purpose is to ensure long-term grid reliability, where reliability is
primarily established through a three-year-ahead electricity generation auction that it
conducts. PJM also states that capacity represents “the commitment of resources to

61

Id.
Regional Transmission Organizations have been created by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to manage
the wholesale markets and transmission for the deregulated states. There are 10 RTOs in North America, and
Ohio’s RTO, PJM Interconnect, is the largest in North America in terms of total electricity generation. See:
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=790. It includes, among other states, Pennsylvania, New Jersey
and Maryland (hence, PJM).
63
PJM. (2016). Capacity Market. PJM Learning Center. Retrieved from: https://learn.pjm.com/threepriorities/buying-and-selling-energy/capacity-markets.aspx.
62
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deliver [electricity] when needed, particularly in case a grid emergency.” Under this
definition, “capacity” consists of dedicated generation reserves.64 PJM likens this to a big
box store that builds extra parking spots for Black Friday, even though it may need those
spots on only one day a year.65 Because capacity relates to generation, it is on the
deregulated side of pricing and is usually passed through to consumers by the commercial
retail electric service company as an RTO charge. Capacity charges are approximately 12
percent of the retail cost of electricity (Figure 4).
Ancillary Charges (deregulated). Ancillary Services describes an assortment of charges
incurred by PJM for managing the grid. There are two general categories of ancillary
services: regulation services and operating reserves. Regulation services provide the
short-term adjustments needed to maintain system frequency. Operating reserves
provide back-up power in the event of emergencies. These charges are around 2 percent
of the total cost of electricity (Figure 4).
Line Losses (deregulated). Line loss charges account for the energy that is lost while
transmitting electricity along transmission and distribution lines. The loss rate is a
percentage of the total energy consumed and is set by the local operating companies for
the IOUs (also called EDUs). Line losses represent approximately 3 percent if final
electricity charges (Figure 4).
Transmission (regulated). Transmission charges enable utilities to recover the cost of
transporting high voltage electricity from generating facilities to distribution systems,
along with the costs associated with maintaining the grid. Until 2015, some Ohio utilities
delegated recovery of transmission costs to the CRES provider through an accounting
provided by the RTO. However, all Ohio utilities now recover transmission charges as a
non-bypassable cost through their EDU. Transmission charges contribute around 8 percent
of final electricity costs (Figure 4).
Distribution (regulated). Low voltage transportation and delivery costs are called
distribution charges and are set by state regulators through tariffs collected by the EDU.
Distribution charges are responsible for about 3 percent of the electricity users’ bill (Figure
4).
Non-bypassable riders (regulated). Non-bypassable riders are charges that cannot be
avoided through shopping. They are assessed to all electricity users in an EDU’s service
territory no matter which company they contract with to provide their electricity. Nonbypassable riders are regulated costs that are assessed with the approval of the PUCO for
items such as deferred fuel costs, storm damage, transmission costs and discounted
electricity purchases for economic development. The cost of non-bypassable riders have
been rapidly rising, and as a result, have become controversial, especially when they are
used to support deregulated activities, such as power generation. These riders now

64

PJM sets forth initially that the purpose of capacity is to encourage the building of new generation. Elsewhere,
however, it defines capacity as a form of standby power – as described by the parking lot analogy. Further
confusing these definitions is that there are also elements of standby power in ancillary charges, such as blackstart,
spinning reserves, etc. Presumably the difference is that the latter are considered emergency standby reserves. See
Id.
65
Id.
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represent approximately 14 percent of a consumer’s cost of electricity usage. (See Figure
4)
Figure 4. Ohio Electricity Price Components, Commercial Customers, 2016

Approximate Structure of Electricity
Price in Ohio, 2016
14%
48%

13%
8%
3%
2%

12%

Energy
Capacity
Ancillary
Losses
Transmission
Distribution
NBP Riders

Source: Scioto Energy (2016). Blue represents deregulated; orange regulated costs. Assumes a commercial
customer with a 47 percent load factor.

One of the challenges to analyzing the effects of deregulation on the final price consumers’ pay is
to separate the regulated portions of the price from the deregulated portions. Unfortunately, due
to the way the data are reported, some of these costs, in particular capacity, line losses and
ancillary charges, are not always easy to untangle from the regulated costs. Two additional factors
complicate efforts to isolate the impact of deregulated generation markets from the other
portions of the bill customers’ pay: (1) Regulated utilities do not commonly break down their costs
and report them publicly in a way that enables direct comparison across states and EDU
territories; and, (2) state regulatory agencies have idiosyncratically deregulated their territories,
often using different terminology to describe similar activities or costs.
The result of this lack of transparency is that most studies looking at the effects of deregulation
have used the “all-in” or “bundled” retail prices. The reason why they do so is that bundled price
data are available from the Energy Information Agency (EIA),66 and unbundled data are not.
Unbundled electricity prices can only be obtained by surveying each state’s regulatory agency and
each regional transmission organization and hope for both cooperation and standard definitions
of customers and charges. Also, the portion of the final bill that comes from regulated costs varies
between states, between EDU territories within states, and across time.
In the end, the EIA’s data are the most accessible and complete source of pricing data over time.
This is why most studies use this data to evaluate the effects of restructured electricity markets.

66

The EIA obtains its information from its EIA form 861 obtained annually from its electric power industry survey.
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The analytical cost of using these data, however, is that the true impact of deregulation on price
is less clear due to the significant fraction of the final bill that remains regulated.
Importantly, the retail price that EIA uses for deregulated states is likely to be higher than that
paid by consumers who shop for their electricity. The EIA price is based upon the “all-in” price paid
by those who do not shop – the standard service offers. As a result, the EIA price misses a
significant portion of the savings generated by competition, especially in a state like Ohio where
some 70 percent of the load that can be shopped is shopped.67 If the state uses an auction to set
the default, or SSO rates, then these rates may in part reflect competition. However as
demonstrated in section IV below, even in those jurisdictions where the standard service offer is
set wholly by a competitive auction, the SSO or default price still significantly underestimates the
savings experienced by customers from deregulation.
Statistical and other techniques were used in this study to obtain the best and most accurate
estimates of the impact of deregulation on electricity prices possible, given the way the data are
collected and reported. See Section V below. Additionally, the Study Team supplemented the EIA
data by gathering information from private sources for larger “mercantile” sales of electricity (i.e.
sales to customers that use more than 700,000 kWh a year). The effects of deregulation on
smaller “non-mercantile” consumers in Ohio were considered by assuming that the discount rates
negotiated by a municipal government aggregator, Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council (NOPEC),
for its customers is a representative discount for Ohio’s non-mercantile consumers.68 NOPEC is
the largest aggregator in the State of Ohio, serving nearly 500,000 customers in northern Ohio,
and is one of the largest in the nation. As a result, its discount rate should be comparable to what
many non-mercantile consumers who shop are able to get.69 During the time-period relevant to
this study, NOPEC has offered its residential customers 6 percent off of the SSO, and its
commercial customers have received 4 percent off of the SSO. Accordingly, for purposes of this
study, we assume that the NOPEC savings are representative of savings offered to non-mercantile
shoppers throughout Ohio.70

67

See Section II(D), supra.
A typical commercial restaurant uses around 500,000 kWhs per year. For this study, we modeled the PTC each
January and June using the average commercial mercantile and non-mercantile load for each electric distribution
utility to estimate total savings from shopping. We then used the NOPEC discount rate to calculate the savings for
the non-mercantile load. See Section VII, infra. This savings estimate is both the most transparent available, and
the easiest to use. However, commercial non-mercantile consumers can, and do, shop and CRES providers also
compete with aggregators for this load, as they do for residential loads.
69
The amount that an aggregator can negotiate off of the SSO will depend upon the size of its load (total
aggregation), as well as other factors, such as the load capacity and how much “headroom” exists between the SSO
and the private party retail price available for such a load.
70
In addition to the 6 percent and 4 percent discount, NOPEC has also typically credited an additional 1 percent
discount to its customers. See https://www.nopecinfo.org/energy-solutions/electric-solutions/electric-pricing/.
That additional discount was not included in this analysis by the Study Team.
68
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For mercantile customers, the Study Team used data that were aggregated from individual
customer records provided by members of the Energy Professionals of Ohio.71 These data were
aggregated to maintain individual confidentiality, and include information on retail electric sales
in the seven different electric distribution utility territories owned by the four investment owned
utilities in Ohio: FirstEnergy, AEP Ohio, Duke Energy, and Dayton Power & Light. The sales data
begin in 2011, which is when true competition began in Ohio.72 These data can be used to
benchmark the PTC for each EDU, as well as distribution, transmission and other non-bypassable
charges (e.g. economic development and other riders). The all-in prices for consumers who
shopped for electricity in Ohio were also determined.
Rate class average load factors and rate class average electricity consumption per year were used
to model electricity prices and make consistent comparisons between each rate class’s PTC and
the privately contracted cost of generated electricity. Both of these calculations are consistent
with the practices of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.73 The average load factor assumed
for the mercantile primary rate class was 67 percent with an average annual consumption, or
usage, of 3 million kWhs. The average load factor assumed for the mercantile secondary rate class
was 47 percent, with annual usage of 1 million kWhs. For the non-mercantile rate class, we
assumed a discount tied to the PTC, as is commonly offered by aggregating companies to their
customers.74
Sales data were broken down into secondary and primary users for each EDU. Secondary users
typically consume lesser amounts of electricity, and take lower-voltage power, while primary
users are generally large industrial consumers that consume large amounts of power and take
high voltage electricity. Primary users are usually mercantile customers as defined by the PUCO,
while secondary users can be either mercantile or non-mercantile customers, depending upon
their yearly loads. Dividing the electricity users into rate class groups is required because
differences in voltage level, electricity load size or usage, and peak load demand significantly
influence the PTC and the purchase price of electricity from CRES providers.

71

Energy Professionals of Ohio is a trade association of brokers and consultants who work in the Ohio retail electricity and
natural gas business. Aggregated customer data does not include data from Ohio IOU affiliated marketers. For a
description of EPO, see: http://www.energyprofessionalsofohio.com/
72

Commercial electricity sales are typically executed with multi-year contracts, or power purchase agreements
(PPAs), that are based on generating prices at the time contracts are signed. As a result, these yearly contract rates
do not compare directly with Standard Service Offer rates, which are set through auctions undertaken over several
years, and from which the generating costs are blended. However, the differences between these two rates
accurately portray differences in the cost of electricity in the generating market. Therefore, the savings identified
accurately represent avoided costs, or savings, that accrue to electricity users by being able to shop for electricity
generation. This is why the PUCO calls the SSO the “Price to Compare.”
73
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. (2013). In The Matter of the Commission’s Review of Customer Rate Impacts
from Ohio Power Company’s Transition to Market Based Rates. PUCO Case Number 13-1530-EL-UNC, Attachment
1A.Retrieved from: https://dis.puc.state.oh.us/CaseRecord.aspx?CaseNo=13-1530.
74
Non-mercantile consumers can also shop among CRES providers. However, because aggregators represent most
of this market and because their retail prices are readily available, the Study Team assumed in its analysis that all
shopping non-mercantile users were able to secure the discount offered by NOPEC.
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Further complicating the analysis of generating costs is the fact that the definitions for rate classes
vary not only among states but also among EDUs within a state. The structure of an EDU’s rate
classes is demonstrated by FirstEnergy’s CEI region:
Table 3. FirstEnergy CEI Rate Classes
Rate Category Description
CE-RSF
Residential Full Service
CE-RSD
Residential Shopper
CE-GFS
General Service-Secondary Full Service
CE-GSD
General Service-Secondary Shopper
CE-GPF
General Service-Primary Full Service
CE-GPD
General Service-Primary Shopper
CE-GSUF
General Service-Sub Transmission Full Service
CE-GSUD
General Service-Sub Transmission Shopper
CE-GTF
General Service-Transmission Full Service
CE-GTD
General Service-Transmission Shopper
CE-STLF
Street Lighting Full Service
CE-STLD
Street Lighting Shopper
CE-TRFF
Traffic Lighting Full Service
CE-TRFD
Traffic Lighting Shopper
CE-POLSF
Private Outdoor Lighting Full Service
CE-POLSD
Private Outdoor Lighting Shopper
Source: North Shore Energy (2016)

B. TRENDS IN RETAIL ELECTRICITY PRICING IN OHIO
1. SSO Trends
Utilities in Ohio have used a mixture of auctions and cost-based generation (cost-of-service plus a
guaranteed return on investment, sometimes referred to herein as the “cost-plus” method)
approaches to arrive at their PTC. As utilities have phased in the use of generation auctions to
determine their PTCs, they have introduced the benefits from competition into that price. The
effect of introducing competition into the PTC calculation is apparent in the experiences of Duke
Energy and AEP Ohio. In January 2012 Duke Energy switched from using a 100 percent “cost-plus”
method of determining its PTC to a 100 percent “auction” method. In so doing, Duke’s PTC for
secondary mercantile consumers dropped by 37 percent, from $0.090 to $0.057 per kWh in the
first quarter of 2012. See Figure 5 below.
AEP Ohio’s Electric Distribution Utility Columbus Southern Power had a similar experience when
it changed its cost of electricity acquisition from a cost-plus PTC to an auction-based PTC. AEP
chose to phase in its auction pricing more slowly than Duke, fully transitioning from a 100 percent
cost-plus PTC to a 100 percent auction-based PTC within a 12-month period. In June of 2014, the
majority of AEP’s PTC was based upon cost-plus accounting. At that time, Columbus Southern’s
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PTC for a secondary mercantile user was over $0.10 per kWh (from 10 percent auction basis and
90 percent cost-based basis). By January of 2015, however, AEP had transitioned to 100 percent
auction pricing, and the price dropped to $0.0865 per kWh. By June of 2015, the price had fallen
further to $0.0549, totaling a 32 percent fall in one year. See Figure 6, below.
Figure 5. Duke Secondary PTC 2010 to 2016
Price to Compare

Ave Contract Rate
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Source: Scioto Energy (2016)

Figure 6. AEP Ohio Columbus Southern Secondary PTC, 2010-2016
Price to Compare

Ave Contract Rate
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Source: Scioto Energy (2016)

The data displayed in the Figures 5 and 6 show that Ohio’s transition to auction-based accounting
allowed the PTC rate to become more competitive with private contract rates. These data show
that competitive electric generation markets work to reduce the difference between the PTC and
private contract rates and lower costs to consumers, which was a goal of deregulating electricitygenerating markets. Further proof lies in the reduction of available avoided costs from shopping.
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The difference between the PTC rate and the private contract rate has all but disappeared in some
utility service areas in Ohio. The difference between the PTC and average private contract rate
fell from $.0444/kWh in January 2014 to $0.0037/kWh in June 2015 in the case of AEP’s Columbus
Southern Power. Duke Energy’s avoided costs dropped from $0.0321/kWh in January 2011 to
$.00689 in June 2016.
As auction prices reduce the PTC, it inevitably makes for an increasingly challenging environment
for aggregators and CRES providers to compete. However, it is important to remember that the
competitive contract prices include legacy prices from prior generation auctions and their
resulting contracts; these lags influence competitive prices for a 2 to 3-year time-period.
Aggregators and CRES providers will be looking for new supplies and possibly new suppliers when
competing with the PTC. Those new supplies are likely to also be lower cost, allowing savings to
continue to be gained through shopping.
The drop in the PTC is not, however, solely attributable to the introduction of competition into
the generation market. In both the Duke and AEP cases, transmission costs moved from PJM passthrough charges into EDU non-bypassable charges. When transmission charges convert into EDU
non-bypassable charges, they drop out of the PTC and move over into the PUCO regulated portion
of a customer’s electric bill. However, the movement of the transmission charge into the nonbypassable charge appears to have had a much greater effect on the AEP Ohio’s PTC than it did
on the Duke PTC.
In the case of AEP Ohio, the typical transmission charge for mercantile users passed through to its
customers by PJM via their CRES provider in the AEP Ohio territory was around $0.007/kWh in
January of 2015.75 Yet AEP Ohio Columbus Southern Power’s price fall between January and June
2015 was over 2.5 cents/kWh between January and June 2015. In other words, moving
transmission charges into non-bypassable charges only accounted for 28 percent of the reported
drop in PTC. The move in transmission costs was a minority component to the drop in the PTC.
The transmission charge that AEP Ohio folded into the non-bypassable charges that was
concurrent with the removal of PJM’s pass-through transmission charge was nearly double the
PJM pass through transmission charge. It appears that AEP Ohio used a formula to derive the cost
of transmission that differed from that used by PJM.76 It is beyond the scope of this Study to
determine what lies behind the transmission charges that were approved by regulators, but this
difference raises an important issue relating to competition: Utilities that are experiencing the
squeeze from lost profit margins from their generating assets have an incentive to try to make up
those losses by shifting costs and assets into their regulated distribution subsidiary companies—
the EDUs. Figure 7 shows how non-bypassable charges spiked between January and June 2015,
which is when the PTC dropped.

75
76

This number is based upon EPO broker calculations.
Transmission costs by AEP are collected through the Basic Transmission Cost Rider.
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Figure 7. AEP Columbus Southern Secondary Mercantile PTC Charges Compared to Average
Private Contract Price and Non-Bypassable Costs (Including Distribution costs)
Price to Compare

Non-Bypassable Charges

Ave Contract Rate
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Source: Scioto Energy (2016)

Indeed it is clear that for AEP Ohio Columbus Southern Power, since 2011 private contract prices
have steadily decreased from 6.5 to 5.3 cents/kWh mainly due to the falling wholesale energy
generating markets; however, non-bypassable costs have steadily increased by more than this
amount (from 3.1 to 5.65 cents/kWh). The increase in non-bypassable charges has essentially
erased the benefits consumers derived from falling wholesale energy prices for the past few years.
Indeed, for this particular rate class, in this particular EDU, total electricity costs exceed 11 cents
per kWh; half of the total cost is from non-bypassable charges. These increases in AEP Ohio’s nonbypassable charges also partially explain why Ohio lags other deregulated states in the
competitiveness of its total electricity rates, as documented by Kuipers and Chapelle (Figure 4,
supra).
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Figure 8. AEP Columbus Southern Secondary Mercantile Total Charges for Shoppers Compared
to Total Charges for Non-Shoppers
Total Rate - Non Shopper

Total Rate - Shopper
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Source: Scioto Energy (2016)

Duke Energy also removed transmission charges from its PTC; however, this shift did not result in
a large contemporaneous rise in its non-bypassable charges, as it did for AEP’s EDU subsidiaries.
The contrast in Duke Energy and AEP Ohio’s Columbus Southern Power non-bypassable charges
raises an important regulatory question: Is it sufficient for utilities to merely separate their
generation and EDU businesses, setting up “Chinese Walls” between their sister subsidiary
companies, for electricity users to realize the full benefit from competition in the electricity
generating market? Senate Bill 221 mandated that all utilities completely separate their
deregulated and regulated businesses, but did not require that the generation assets be sold to
third parties. Duke Energy, which saw no dramatic rise in its non-bypassable charges when it
transitioned to PTCs based solely on the outcomes from generation auctions, had previously sold
all of its generation assets to a third-party. AEP, on the other hand, retained its generation fleet
as a subsidiary.77

77

Howland, E. (2014). AEP Ohio spins off power plants into unregulated genco. Retrieved from:
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/aep-ohio-spins-off-power-plants-into-unregulated-genco/210312/. See also: PR
Newswire (2015). Duke Energy completes sale of its non-regulated Midwest generation business to Dynegy.
Retrieved from: http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/duke-energy-completes-sale-of-its-non-regulatedmidwest-generation-business-to-dynegy-300060392.html
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Figure 9. Duke Energy’s Secondary Mercantile PTC Charges Compared to Average Private
Contract Price and Non-Bypassable Costs (Includes Distribution Costs)
Price to Compare
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Source: Scioto Energy (2016)

Other EDU regions in Ohio also are experiencing increases in non-bypassable charges. For
instance, non-bypassable charges in CEI’s secondary mercantile market have gone from $0.039 in
January of 2012 to $0.058 in January of 2016. Rising non-bypassable charges in Ohio have had the
effect of offsetting some, or all, of the savings obtained from falling energy prices on the PTC or
from shopping. Graphs for all the EDUs and their mercantile and non-mercantile prices from 20092016 can be found in Appendix 4.
2. Avoided Cost and Headroom
Standard Service Offers that are determined by competitive auctions will inevitably lead to falling
PTCs, until the most economically efficient possible outcome is reached. Inevitably this leads to
the potential for shrinking avoided costs for consumers. It also leads to shrinking “headroom” –
which is a concept similar to avoided cost, but with important distinctions. Headroom is the
difference between the PTC and current contract prices. Avoided cost is the difference between
PTC and the price paid under previous contracts, which typically lag by a year or two. A consumer
may, for instance, beat the PTC one year in its contract, but not the next, and still come out well
ahead over the span of the two years.
In a mature deregulated market, where electricity generation auctions are used to determine
SSOs, there will be less headroom. This is exactly the case in Ohio in 2016, where auctions have
been bringing down the PTC. For instance, in July 2016 Direct Energy saw Ohio’s headroom drop
to below $20.00 per megawatt hour (MWh) for most of its July 2016 Ohio markets, and some are
below $10/MWh.78 It remains to be seen whether sufficient headroom exists in the marketplace
to continue to entice aggregators and CRES providers to compete to expand their share of Ohio’s
78

Communication with Direct Energy.
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retail electricity markets as their cost differential with PTCs is eroded. It is important to
remember, however, that headroom establishes the difference between private contract retail
prices and the PTC, and as such it includes a profit margin for the CRES providers
Even while auction-based SSO, or default, rates trend toward the average shopping price, CRES
providers and aggregators still have ample opportunity to find savings for their customers. One
way they can do this is by targeting customers in rate classes that have more headroom.
Additionally, bigger electricity consumers can find savings through competition even when
headroom is negative. This is because competitive markets allow for targeting specific customer
load factors, or for the consumer to use load management practices that they could not employ
in regulated markets. Moreover, there will likely always be some headroom: companies that bid
into the standard service auction must undertake full-requirements obligations. This means that
the party bidding generation into an auction needs to include an element of volume risk into its
auction bid that CRES providers negotiating with shopping customers may not have to include.79
CRES providers negotiating with end users can include contractual load bandwidths in their
contracts, or use other techniques to constrain volume risk. These contractual techniques give
CRES providers knowledge about the expected distribution of volumes demanded by their
customers, thereby reducing volume risk.
Customers are motivated to enter contracts by avoided cost (or money saved) against the PTC.
Table 4 displays our estimates of the costs secondary mercantile customers of Ohio’s CRES
providers in Ohio avoided from 2011 to 2016, expressed in terms of avoided costs as a percent of
the Price to Compare. For most EDUs, avoided costs were very high when competition began in
earnest around 2010. This was attributable to the fact that some of Ohio’s utilities had not
completely phased in auction pricing as the basis for their PTC. FirstEnergy’s distribution utilities,
which used 100 percent auction pricing from the early stages of deregulation, started with a
smaller avoided cost for shoppers than did the EDUs of the other IOUs. AEP Ohio, for example,
experienced a significant drop in avoided costs once its transition to auction-based pricing was
completed (from January 2015 to June 2015).
As of June 2016, avoided costs for secondary mercantile users had dropped to below 10 percent
in most markets, indicating that competitive auction pricing has driven down the Price to
Compare. The largest users of electricity, the primary users, have experienced similar trends in
avoided costs since the start of deregulation in the generating market. Avoided costs for primary
customers in both the Duke and AEP Ohio Power territories have leveled off to around 10 percent
for the past few years.

79

One of DTE Energy’s arguments against deregulation in Michigan is that the 10 percent of Michigan shoppers are
free to come back at any time to the SSO should the headroom disappear. This forces the 90 percent that are not
allowed to shop to keep and pay for standby power in case the liberated 10 percent return. This scenario of course
would be a disaster in Ohio, since around 70 percent of Ohio consumers shop. However, most shoppers in Ohio are
contractually bound, and cannot abandon their contracts without consequences.
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Table 4. Average Avoided Costs as Percent off PTC for the Secondary Mercantile Market
AEP81
Duke
DPL
FirstEnergy82
Average

2011
20%
34%
19%
16%
22%

2012
24%
7%
15%
15%
15%

2013
29%
14%
16%
13%
18%

2014
30%
17%
20%
24%
23%

2015
18%
13%
19%
21%
18%

201680
4%
13%
7%
7%
8%

Source: Scioto Energy (2016)

The central point to take away from Table 4 is that competition in the electric generating market
is working: PTCs are decreasing, however, CRES providers still provide a cost advantage over the
IOUs, even after the market equilibrium has been established.

V. COMPARING TOTAL RETAIL ELECTRICITY COSTS IN MIDWESTERN
DERGERULATED STATES TO MIDWESTERN REGULATED STATES
As discussed earlier, the EIA data fail to account for the full impact of deregulation of the market
for electricity generation because the agency reports the “all-in” price of electricity to end-users
using the standard service offers published by the utilities. As a result, the data do not reflect
savings due to shopping, and analyses based upon these data underestimate the total savings
attributable to deregulation. Nevertheless, to obtain the best feasible estimates of the impact of
deregulation without considering shopping, we conducted three different statistical tests using
the data available. The idea was to determine if the deregulation of electricity generation markets
was of benefit to consumers:







In the first section comparisons of means and regression analyses were used to
demonstrate the price differences between regulated and deregulated states and to
determine that these price differences were not attributable to other variables other than
the regulated vs. deregulated status of the states.
Two-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used in section b to test if there was a
difference in the relative price of electricity in the three deregulated Midwestern states
(Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) and the three regulated Midwestern states (Indiana,
Michigan, and Wisconsin)
Section c presents a graphic showing the trends in mean Midwestern state electricity
prices before and after deregulation
Section d contains a difference-in-difference regression model. This analysis examined
differences over time in the price of electricity (this is the first difference) and between
regulated and deregulated states (which is the second difference). The difference-indifference regression equations isolated the impact of deregulation among the states on

80

Through June of 2016.
Average of GS2 Secondary and GS3 Primary for both Columbus Southern Power and Ohio Power.
82
Includes secondary rate classes for Ohio Edison, Toledo Edison and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company.
81

Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University

34

Electricity Consumer Choice in Ohio

price movements in electricity over time. The results from this model indicate that
deregulation tends to decrease the prices paid by electric consumers.

A. THE UNITED STATES OVERALL
Energy Information Administration data on electricity prices paid by consumers were examined
for forty-eight of the fifty states and the District of Columbia from 1990 to 2014.83 Figure 10 gives
the mean electricity prices in regulated vs. deregulated states for the period from 1990 to 2014,
demonstrating that prices were consistently higher in the deregulated states.
Figure 10. Mean Electricity Prices in Regulated vs. Deregulated States, 1990 – 2014

Note: 1Data were from the Form EIA-861 Annual Electric Power Industry Report. All prices given in 2014 dollars
Source: the Authors (2016)

To determine whether this observed difference in mean prices between regulated and
deregulated states is an independent effect and not an artifact of a set of other variables omitted
from the analysis, we performed a regression analysis designed to control for other variables
suspected to influence electricity prices. The details of this analysis are reported in Appendix 5.
The results indicate that even when controlling for other variables that affect electricity prices,
those found in deregulated states were higher than those found in regulated states. This is shown
83

Alaska and Hawaii were omitted due to their geographical isolation and unique electricity markets.
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by the positive and statistically significant coefficient on the regulation/deregulation variable
(β=.01438, t = 9.04). More specifically, the model shows that over 75% of the variation in state
electricity prices may be accounted for by the status of regulation/deregulation, generation
capacity, fuel mix, and fuel prices. Additionally, Joskow (2006) found that utility debt is a
significant predictor of electricity prices.84 Moreover, when all of these other variables are
statistically held constant, the price of electricity in deregulated states was about $0.014 higher
than in regulated states.85 Thus the regulatory status of a state is a statistically significant
independent predictor of that state’s electricity price.
The fact that the overall price of electricity had been consistently higher in the states that
embraced deregulation helps to understand why the deregulated states chose to deregulate in
the first place. Deregulation was intended to lower prices, or to at least dampen growth in prices,
by introducing competition into electricity markets. But the regression reported in this section
contains no meaningful information about the effects of such choices on electricity price before
regulation occurred relative to prices after deregulation occurred. Nor does the regression
contain information specifically about the Midwestern industrial states, including Ohio. This is
done in the following section.

B. SIX MIDWESTERN STATES
The best group of states to use a comparison group for Ohio are its neighboring states because
they share similar economies and energy systems. Accordingly, our analysis shifted to a
comparison of the three deregulated midwestern states (Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) in
relation to the three regulated ones (Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin). Appendix 5 presents the
mean Midwestern electricity prices in the regulated and deregulated states for 1990 to 2014, all
in real 2014 dollars. O’Connor and O’Connell-Diaz (2015)86 argued that 2003 marks the year when
deregulation in generation markets began to take hold in the Midwestern states.
The two-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test reported in Table 5 shows that the effect of
deregulation on the price of electricity in the deregulated states relative to the regulated states
was favorable at the 99 percent level of confidence.87 In other words, on average, the relative
price of electricity in the deregulated states declined. After 2003 the mean price of electricity in
the deregulated states remained higher, on average, than in the regulated states. However, the
mean price (adjusted for inflation) of electricity increased from 8.6 to 9.3 cents per kilowatt-hour
in the regulated states, while it decreased from 10.5 to 9.6 cents per kWh in the deregulated
states.

84

Joskow’s finding is especially notable in Ohio given the 13 July 2016 report by UBS Securities entitled, “First
Energy Corporation: How Much Debt can the Utilities Support?” https://neo.ubs.com/shared/d1zYlfYrdo/
85
Technically, the binary variable was coded with unity (1) for deregulated states and zero (0) for regulated states.
86
O’Connor, P. & O’Connell-Diaz, E. (2015). Evolution of the Revolution: The sustained success of retail electricity
competition. COMPETE. Retrieved from:
http://www.competecoalition.com/files/COMPETE%20White%20Paper_Evolution%20of%20Revolution_Final.pdf
87
Technically, the p-value on the interaction term between the two variables (a) before-after and (b) deregulated
state or not in the two-way analysis of variance was significant at p < .001.

Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University

36

Electricity Consumer Choice in Ohio

Table 5. Effects of Deregulation on Midwest Electricity Prices in All Sectors Combined
1990 - 2014
Deregulated vs. Regulated States
Deregulated States
Regulated States
OH, IL, PA
IN, MI, WI
Mean (se)
Mean (se)
0.1049 (0.0022)
0.0859 (0.0022)

Before
(1990-2002)
After
0.0957 (0.0014)
(2003-2014)
*** Statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level.
Real 2014 dollars
Source: the Authors (2016)

0.0930 (0.0023)

Table 6 shows a two-way ANOVA result for electricity prices in the residential sector. The result
in this table is similar in structure to that in Table 5. These data show that in the six Midwest
states examined, deregulation has delivered on its promise to cut electricity prices. On average,
residential electricity prices went up from 10.6 to 11.8 cents per kWh in the regulated states, while
they dropped from 13.0 to 11.9 cents per kWh over the same time-period in the deregulated
states. It should be born in mind that these results reflect the EIA prices, which reflect SSO prices
in deregulated jurisdictions. For the reasons set forth earlier, the SSO price has been consistently
higher than the price available to shoppers in deregulated markets; accordingly, the changes in
relative EIA price data are a conservative indicator of the effect of deregulation. These results are
also consistent with the findings in the O’Connor and O’Connell-Diaz study.
Table 6. Effects of Deregulation on Midwest Electricity Prices in the Residential Sector
1990 – 2014

Before
(1990-2002)
After
(2003-2014)
Values are in real 2014 dollars
Before After
Deregulation

Deregulated vs. Regulated States
Deregulated States
Regulated States
OH, IL, PA
IN, MI, WI
Mean (se)
Mean (se)
.1304 (0.0030)
.1060 (.0018)
.1186 (.0018)

.1178 (.0298)

Source: The Authors (2016)

Tables 5 and 6 have provided empirical evidence that the average price of electricity has, since
deregulation, increased in the regulated Midwestern states while going down in the deregulated
states. This evidence paints the big picture of the impact of deregulating electricity generation
markets on consumers. But the tables omit consideration of path dependencies, and so in the
following section the results of another statistical analysis are provided, both of which were
conducted to consider and control for path dependencies.
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C. THE OBSERVED TRENDS IN MEAN MIDWESTERN STATE ELECTRICITY PRICES
Figure 11 shows, by year, the mean electricity price of the three states in each of the two groups,
regulated and deregulated states. The data cover the years 1990 to 2014. From 1990 to 2010,
the average price of electricity in the regulated states was below that of the deregulated states.
However, once deregulation entered the Midwest from 2001 to 2003 the relationship between
these two lines began to change. Prior to the introduction of deregulation, the average price in
Illinois, Ohio and Pennsylvania was above the average of Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin. After
2003 the average prices begin to converge, with the percentage increase in the average price
increasing much more quickly in the deregulated states than in the regulated states. Finally,
between 2010 and 2011 the average price in the deregulated status begins to trend down and
drops below that of the average of the regulated three states. These movements in electricity
prices are evidence that since 2010 Midwestern states with deregulation have tended to reduce
electricity prices relative to those without deregulation.
Figure 11. Changes in Electricity Price Means in the Combined Residential, Commercial and
Industrial Sectors

Source: the Authors (2016)

To determine whether these observed price difference trends were attributable to path
dependencies, in the next section we report upon a difference in differences analysis. This form
of analysis was used because cost structures and competitive positions from the past shape
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operating costs and prices in the future, so the price of electricity in any given state in any given
year is likely to be closely related to the price of electricity in that state in the predecessor and
successor years. The difference-in-difference analysis estimated the effect of deregulation
statistically and isolated it from the effects of path dependencies.

D. REMOVING PATH DEPENDENCIES FROM THE MIDWESTERN STATE ESTIMATES USING
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS
Ohio began to implement the deregulation of its electric generation markets in 2001. However,
the state’s IOU’s did not begin to purchase their power on open markets until May 2009, when
FirstEnergy engaged in its first competitive auction for power. AEP followed in December 2011
and Duke in 2014 (Figure 1). We also noted in the results from the two-way repeated measures
ANOVA that an inflection point in the graph of the average electricity prices in the deregulated
states did not occur until 2010 (Figure 11). This observation led us to test when the market for
electricity began to reflect the influence of deregulation.88 We first used the date proposed by
O’Connor and O’Connell-Diaz, 2003. We then tested 2009 as the date when competition began in
earnest based on when retail electric companies first began to bid on electricity generation for
their Ohio customers, using the powers granted to them with the passage of SB 221.89 The analysis
was designed to model the effect of deregulation by estimating the difference between electricity
prices before and after the time at which deregulation began for both the states that deregulated
and those that did not, and then to compare the difference between the groups—hence the
moniker “difference-in-differences” analysis. This approach ensures that the effect of
deregulation is statistically isolated from any path dependencies within groups of regulated vs.
deregulated states. Table 7, presents a DID summary table.90
The price values in Table 7 are the estimated regression coefficients from the difference-indifferences model. The “Difference” columns in the table are the differences obtained by
subtracting the price estimates after deregulation from the prices before deregulation. The values
obtained in the Difference in Differences row in the table were obtained by subtracting the price
difference estimates for the regulated states from the price difference estimates for the
deregulated states.

88

Statistically significant at p > .001.
Technically known as “difference-in-differences” analysis. Kuipers, et al also suggest that 2008 to 2009 is a better
date to measure the beginning of the effectiveness of deregulation. This is also consistent with Ohio’s specific
experience when retail providers began to compete for customers and generated power.
90
This DID model took the following general form: y = β0 + β1 D^post+β2 D^Tr+ β3 D^Post D^Tr+Duration+ε, where
y is retail electricity price, D^post is a time dummy variable with 0 representing pre-deregulation and 1 representing
post-deregulation, D^Tr is a state dummy variable with 0 representing regulated states and 1 representing
deregulated states, Duration is the number of years since the beginning of the data, and D^Post D^Tr is an
interaction of the post and treatment variables. The price values in this table are the estimated regression
coefficients from this model.
89
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Table 7. Average Price per kWh under Two Assumptions about When Deregulation Began
2003

Deregulated
States
Regulated
States
Difference in
Differences

2009

Prices prior to
Deregulation

Prices after
Deregulation

Difference

Prices prior to
Deregulation

Prices after
Deregulation

Difference

0.0951

0.0787

-0.0164

0.1092

0.0924

-0.0168

0.0867

0.0866

-0.0001

0.0939

0.0947

0.0008

-0.0163
Source: the Authors (2016)

-0.0176

On the basis of Table 7, and assuming that O’Connor and O’Connell-Diaz’s 2003 date marks the
beginning of truly competitive markets for electricity generation:
(a) Electricity prices (adjusted for inflation) in the regulated states before deregulation were, on
average, $.0867/kWh;
(b) Electricity prices in the deregulated states before deregulation were, on average, $.0951/kWh;
(c) Electricity prices in the deregulated states after deregulation were $.0787 per kWh; and
(d) Electricity prices in the regulated states were, on average, also $.0866 per kWh.
Our estimate of the independent effect of regulation is that it saved $.0163 per kWh, on average,
in the combined industrial, commercial and residential sectors, in the three deregulated
Midwestern states.
Alternatively, also based upon Table 7, and assuming that the most suitable year to represent
deregulation is 2009, the results indicate that:
(a) Electricity prices in the regulated states before deregulation were, on average, $.0939/kWh;
(b) Electricity prices in the deregulated states before deregulation were, on average, $.1092/kWh;
(c) Electricity prices in the deregulated states after deregulation were $.0924 per kWh; and
(d) Electricity prices in the regulated states were, on average, also $.0947 per kWh.
Because wholesale markets did not begin to develop in Ohio until 2009, following the passing of
SB 221, we deemed 2009 as the most appropriate year deregulation began in the Midwest region.
Using this year as the marker, we determined that the independent effect of deregulation saved
approximately $.0176 per kWh in the combined industrial, commercial and residential sectors of
the three deregulated states.91

91

Statistically significant at p > 0.001. Using 2003 as the date deregulation began would have diminished estimated
savings from deregulation by about 7.4% or between $169M and $175M per year.
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VI. OTHER VALUE AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEREGULATION
A. DEMAND RESPONSE AND OTHER PROGRAMS
In deregulated generation markets, regional transmission organizations can use demand response
and energy efficiency programs to reduce peak load requirements. PJM, the regional transmission
organization that covers Ohio, for instance, sponsors a demand response program designed to
reduce power consumption during times of exceptionally high peak usage. This tends to reduce
the amount of electricity demanded and supplied by the state’s utilities during their highest price
periods, and therefore to reduce their profits. The purpose of the program is to mitigate the need
to build expensive new peaking generation plants. PJM, upon recognizing an event requiring a
system-wide response, issues a notice to customers and demand response providers to curtail
consumption. Those who participate in the program are paid on a per MWh basis for their
curtailment. This results in savings for all consumers in the regional transmission organization
footprint because less generation, transmission, and distribution is required to meet peak
demand. Such energy-savings are incentivized under deregulated markets, but not under
traditional cost-plus regulation.
Other new programs have been introduced that also provide savings. These include, among
others, economic load, capacity market, synchronized reserve and frequency regulation demand
response.92 In addition to these programs, in deregulated areas energy efficiency can be bid into
capacity markets to reduce costs. Ascertaining the savings realized in Ohio from these sorts of
programs was beyond the scope of this project. But one study that was done by ACEEE in 2013 to
assess the value created by Ohio’s energy efficiency program projected around $5 billion in savings
by 2020, of which $880 million was from the program effects on prices due to reduced demand.93
The value derived from demand response and similar programs available in deregulated markets
is similar: these programs reduce the need to build new generation capacity and grid; they lead
to improved system reliability; and they reduce demand generally resulting in suppliers being
pressured to lower prices and control costs.

B. LOAD MANAGEMENT AND OTHER CUSTOMER STRATEGIES
Deregulation also allows customers with larger loads to manage their electricity use in a manner
that saves money. The most common contract for smaller users is a “fixed price” contract, where
the energy portion of the bill is fixed at a contractual rate over the term of the contract. Larger
electricity users, however, commonly use a “block and index” strategy for procuring power, where
a portion of the load is fixed, and portion acquired on a variable price index. These customers can
manage their loads and can curtail use when price indices are high. Large consumers with a
predictable load also favor this strategy, since they can lock in the block at lower prices when it is
convenient to do so.
92

These generally fall into the classification of “ancillary services” by PJM. Costs for these services can be
constrained through demand response programs. See, e.g., https://learn.pjm.com/three-priorities/buying-andselling-energy/ancillary-services-market.aspx
93
Neubaurer, M. et al. (2013). Ohio’s Energy Resource Standard: Impacts on the Ohio Wholesale Electricity Market
and Benefits to the State, retrieved from: http://aceee.org/research-report/e138
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Other load management strategies available include Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) index
pricing (based on hourly clearing price on the LMP market), heat rate pricing (based upon natural
gas prices), tranche pricing and hedging. These sorts of load management strategies are normally
not available in regulated markets. Their aggregate value may be substantial.

VII. ESTIMATED SAVINGS CREATED BY DEREGULATION IN OHIO
A. SAVINGS CREATED BY DEREGULATION, 2011-2016
1. Avoided Costs from Shopping
The total cost that Ohio consumers avoided due to shopping can be calculated for the mercantile
and non-mercantile classes by multiplying the average avoided cost in each year for each rate
class by the amount of electricity that was consumed by shoppers. In the following estimates,
industrial users are assumed to be mercantile and residential consumers are assumed to be nonmercantile. Commercial customers, on the other hand, could be either. Unfortunately, the PUCO
does not report the volume of electricity consumed by mercantile or non-mercantile customers.
Instead, the PUCO reports the information based on industrial, commercial and residential loads.94
Accordingly, some assumptions were made to approximate the savings to mercantile and nonmercantile customers. The Study Team assumed that primary (i.e. high voltage) users are
approximately equivalent to the industrial load. Likewise, we have assumed that all residential
users are non-mercantile. Data obtained from Scioto Energy on the distribution of mercantile and
non-mercantile secondary commercial electricity usage from June 2014 to June 2015 (Table 8)
suggest that slightly more than half the total commercial load is non-mercantile. This is because
there are many commercial users in Ohio that have relatively small loads. Table 8 sets forth the
approximate percentage of commercial loads in Ohio that were non-mercantile between 20142015.
For purposes of estimating the total savings garnered by Ohio’s electricity users from shopping,
the Study Team assumed the percentages listed in Table 8 to be the mercantile commercial loads
for each EDU territory, and the remainder to be non-mercantile. Total savings from shopping, by
utility and year, for the mercantile markets are listed in Tables 9 and 10.

94

Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. Completed Annual Reports 2011-2015. Retrieved from:
http://www.puco.ohio.gov/apps/directorylister/annualreports.cfm
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Table 8. Percent of Secondary Commercial Loads in Ohio That Were Mercantile
June 2014-June 2015
EDU
MWh
Duke
61%
FE OE
32%
FE CEI
50%
FE TE
33%
AEP OP
44%
AEP CS
54%
DPL
41%
Total
47%
Source: Scioto Energy (2016)

Table 9. Total Savings through Shopping, by Utility, Mercantile Markets
2011- 2015 (millions of dollars)
EDU
Savings
AEP
$975.9
Duke
$401.6
DPL
$143.3
First Energy
$947.4
Total
$2,468
Source: Scioto Energy (2016) (Assumes all industrial and a fraction of commercial loads) 95

Table 10. Total Savings through Shopping, Mercantile Markets
2011- 2015 (millions of dollars)
Year
Savings
2011
$391.5
2012
$324.6
2013
$600.8
2014
$664.2
2015
$487.1
Total
$2,468
Source: Scioto Energy (2016) (Assumes all industrial and a fraction of commercial loads) 96

Calculating the total avoided costs in Ohio for non-mercantile consumers, then, requires the
addition of the remaining fraction of the commercial market, plus the residential market. Our
estimates of the savings realized by non-mercantile customers were derived by applying the
NOPEC savings rate to all commercial customers (4 percent) and to all residential customers (6
percent). These savings are listed by year in Table 11.

95
96

The formula used to determine these numbers is: (PTC - Average Contract Rate)*(Mercantile Shopping Volume)
Id.
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Table 11. Total Savings Through Shopping for Non-Mercantile Markets
2011-2015 (millions of dollars)
Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Total

Savings
$105.1
$118.6
$143.3
$160.0
$157.8
$684.8

Source: Authors (2016).

The total avoided cost from 2011 to 2015 for shopping customers by IOU is presented in Table 12.
Table 12. Total Savings Through Shopping for Non-Mercantile Markets, by Utility
2011-2015 (millions of dollars)
Utility
FE
AEP
DPL
Duke
Total

Savings
$371.7
$150.1
$65.3
$97.7
$684.8

Source: Scioto Energy (2016)

Adding up all the savings between 2011 and 2015, we estimate that the total avoided cost for
Ohio consumers who chose to shop was approximately $3.15 billion, for an average annual savings
of $630 million. See Table 13 below. However, as noted before, this is only the savings that
occurred through shopping. A more detailed breakdown of shopping savings for each EDU can be
found in Appendix 3.
Table 13. Total Shopping Savings from Mercantile and Non-Mercantile Markets
2011-2015 (millions of dollars)
Year
Mercantile
Non-Mercantile
Total
2011
$391.60
$105.1
$496.70
2012
$324.69
$118.6
$443.29
2013
$600.81
$143.3
$744.11
2014
$664.21
$160.0
$824.21
2015
$487.19
$157.8
$645.19
Total
$2,468.50
$684.80
$3,153.30
Source: Scioto Energy (2016)

These savings must be distinguished from those achieved through use of a deregulated standard
service offer. The savings from deregulated SSOs – discussed and quantified below – are passed
through to all EDU electricity consumers in Ohio, regardless of whether they shop or not.
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2. Savings Resulting from Standard Service Offers
Having power generation costs set through a deregulated SSO provides significant value to all
consumers in Ohio who obtain their power through an investor-owned utility, regardless of
whether they shop or not. As discussed earlier, this has been especially so since the EDUs began
to use 100% auction-based SSOs, rather than cost-based accounting.
The best way to estimate the savings is to use the average savings demonstrated by the statistical
models developed from comparing the two sets of Midwestern states as presented in Section V,
supra. The estimated cost difference between the regulated and deregulated all-in electricity
prices for Midwestern states after 2009 (the year Ohio markets began) was around $0.0176 per
kWh consumed.
Accordingly, the Study Team multiplied $0.0176/kWh times the number of IOU delivered hours
each year to estimate savings generated through deregulation, without shopping. As
demonstrated earlier, Ohio experienced an average 36% drop in price in the SSO price in the Duke
Energy and AEP Ohio jurisdictions as a result of the switch from cost-based accounting to marketbased auctions. Arguably this is the essence of deregulation – going from cost-based accounting
to market-based auctions. The $0.0176 in savings represents the average savings for all SSOs
during the study period, regardless of whether they were auction based, cost-based or a mixture
of both. This number represents a much smaller percent off of the average price than 36%.
Nevertheless, we concluded that a savings of $0.0176/kWh is appropriate. It is conservative,
especially if shopping savings are added to this, since shopping savings are likely to be diminished
as 100 percent auction-based SSOs are introduced.97
The savings estimates developed with the difference-in-difference model suggest that we can
multiply $0.0176 per kWh savings by total kWh consumption from all IOU ratepayers from 2011
to 2015. Based upon this estimate, we conclude that Ohio’s electricity users saved an additional
$11.82 billion during this timeframe as a result of the change to market-based auctions. The
annual savings are listed in Table 14.
Total savings from deregulated SSOs and the savings realized by shopping from 2011-2015 can be
determined by adding Tables 10 and 12 ($3.15 and $11.82 billion, respectively), for a total savings
of $14.975 billion over five years (Table 15 below). This suggests that over the past five years,
Ohio has realized an average total annual savings of around $3 billion for its IOU consumers as a
result of deregulation

97

This savings number is also consistent with the number arrived at by the Pennsylvania University team, which
concluded that Pennsylvania’s all-sector EIA (based upon SSO prices) went from 15 percent above national average
to 1 percent below the national average as a result of deregulation. See Simeone & Hanger, supra, at 24.

Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University

45

Electricity Consumer Choice in Ohio

Table 14. Savings from Deregulated SSO in Ohio, Not Including Shopping
2011-2015 (millions of dollars)
Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Total

Savings
$2,395
$2,366
$2,342
$2,380
$2,339
$11,822

Source: the Authors (2016)

Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Total

Table 15. Total Savings Due to Deregulation in Ohio
2011-2015 (millions of dollars)
Shopping
SSO
$496.70
$2,395.00
$443.29
$2,366.00
$744.11
$2,342.00
$824.21
$2,380.00
$645.19
$2,339.00
$3,153.30
$11,822.00

Total
$2,891.70
$2,809.29
$3,086.11
$3,204.21
$2,984.19
$14,975.30

Source: the Authors (2016)

B. PROJECTED SAVINGS GOING FORWARD
1. For Shopping Customers Against SSO
As deregulated markets that use standard service offers mature, we can expect that the amount
of avoided cost will be lower over time. That has certainly been the case for Ohio since its EDUs
started to use auctions to set the SSO. Accordingly, we can reasonably assume the 2015 savings
for shopping will be comparable to what we can expect for the years 2016 to 2020. Using this
number, we can estimate that the total savings for shopping over the next five years will be $3.225
billion.98
2. For Auction-Based SSO Against Regulation
We can use the same statistical approach that gave us past savings compared to the alternative
model of regulation to project savings going forward, assuming that Ohio continues to stay
deregulated, continues to use a standard service offer, and continues to use an auction-based
strategy for setting the Price to Compare.99 To calculate the projected savings, the Study Team
98

We might expect that the headroom will continue to become tighter as SSO auctions mature (as has been the
trend in the first half of 2016), but we can also expect that shopping will increase as its benefits become better
known. For this reason, the last full year of shopping savings – 2015 – was used to project savings from shopping
going forward.
99
Texas is the only jurisdiction in 2016 that does not use an SSO. Default markets are set in that state by placement
into a commercial retail supplier through a different mechanism.
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used the 2015 PUCO Long Term Forecast of Energy Requirements, and then assumed that 91
percent of Ohio’s load would be provided by IOU electric distribution companies (i.e. subject to
the IOU standard service offers). We also assumed the $0.0176 per kWh savings found from the
models.
Accordingly, the anticipated savings for Ohio due to the SSO auction for the five-year period, from
2016 to 2020 is $11.717 billion dollars. Adding these savings to the anticipated savings from
shopping, Ohio consumers will save an estimated $14.942 billion dollars over the next five years,
for an average of $2.988 billion dollars per year.
Table 16. Total Projected Savings Due to Deregulation in Ohio, Including Shopping
2016-2020 (millions of dollars)
Year
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Total

Shopping Savings
$645
$645
$645
$645
$645
$3,225

SSO Auction Savings
$2,333
$2,338
$2,343
$2,349
$2,354
$11,717

Total Savings
$2,844
$2,829
$2,833
$2,839
$2,844
$14,942

Source: the Authors (2016). Source of usage projections: Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, Ohio Long Term
Forecast of Energy Requirements, July 22, 2015.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This study was designed to assess the effects of deregulation of electricity generation on electricity
prices in Ohio. This has recently become a source of controversy in Ohio as a result of several of
Ohio’s IOUs having sought financial support for their uncompetitive electricity generation plants.
After a decision by FERC that blocked those efforts, some of Ohio’s IOUs have begun lobbying for
Ohio to return to reregulation of the entire electricity industry.
Based on the results of this study, such reregulation would cost Ohio’s ratepayers several billion
dollars a year. The electric utility industry’s traditional business model of a state-regulated vertical
monopoly that encompasses generation, transmission and distribution, based on a fixed tariff
applied to the volume of consumption, is no longer viable in Ohio. This is due to a combination of
technological progress, the development of regional wholesale electricity markets due to federal
legislation and deregulation, and flat demand growth.
Reregulation might benefit the incumbent utilities in Ohio, but would not be conducive to industry
flexibility, innovation, or adaptation to local social, technological and environmental change. It
would have a material and deleterious effect on industrial users and manufacturing. It would also
unnecessarily increase the cost of electricity to Ohio’s residential and commercial ratepayers, and
as our analysis shows, do so in a significant and substantial way.
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But more than disruptive innovation is driving the need for electric-utility business and regulatory
models to change. Persistent demand for reliable, affordable electric service; reduced
consumption through efficiency, conservation and demand response; increased grid efficiency
based on networked smart grids that allow for local and distributed power generation; and
reduced carbon emissions through a switch from fossil fuels to renewable and advanced energy
technologies are all also significant contributing factors. Of course, this all causes problems for
electric utilities vested heavily in uncompetitive fuel sources and outmoded plants, wires and
equipment. These problems are especially weighty for utility companies that rely almost
exclusively on huge, fossil-fuel fired centralized plants, rather than more efficient distributed
technologies.
The problems currently faced by Ohio IOUs will not be solved by reregulation. To reregulate would
simply be to return to a system of centrally regulated monopoly that is more or less the same as
it was when the electric system was initially set up in the early 20th century. Huge coal-or nucleargenerated power plants would generate electricity and distribute it to consumers through a grid
owned and operated by the utilities. As technology is changing, more and more electricity will be
generated by cleaner, cheaper, distributed sources, and grids will become smarter and localized.
The problem with reregulation of electricity generation (aside from the substantially increased
costs it would bring to consumers) is that the technologies around which industry and society are
organized, and which increasingly shape the U.S. electric system, will continue to evolve quickly.
From micro-grids to distributed power generation and new forms of power storage, it is becoming
apparent that a new kind of electric generation, distribution, and regulation system and business
model is inevitable. The electric utility industry of the future cannot and will not look like the one
of the past or the one of the present. Neither can related policy and regulatory practices.
There is no reason for Ohio to return now to the 20 th-century command and control model of a
vertically integrated utility. A strategy of reregulation would be shortsighted because of its failure
to recognize the inevitability of technological advances and its blindness to regulatory and
institutional changes. Reregulation would cost Ohio’s ratepayers billions of dollars per year,
threaten Ohio’s manufacturing base, and cripple Ohio’s efforts to attract new industry. The
research contained in this Study demonstrates that Ohio consumers have realized billions of
dollars in savings due to the deregulation of electricity generation. These savings are in keeping
with the trends seen by other states that have switched to competitive electricity generation.
These results are also consistent with the expectation and economic theory that was in place at
the time deregulation began.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1.
Map of States with Deregulated Electricity Generation Markets100

100

Kuipers, W. & Chappelle, L .(2016).Electricity Customer Choice Out-Performs Traditional Monopoly. Utility Dive.
Retrieved from: http://www.utilitydive.com/news/electricity-customer-choice-out-performs-traditional-monopoly1/424986/
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APPENDIX 2.
Percentage of Customer Base that Shops for Energy in Ohio, 2008-2016
AEP

Duke

DPL

First Energy

80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
MAR-08MAR-09MAR-10MAR-11MAR-12MAR-13MAR-14MAR-15MAR-16

Source: PUCO (2016)101

Switching Rate by Percent of Total Energy Sold to Shopping Customers
Sales %

Mar-08

Mar-09

Mar-10

Mar-11

Mar-12

Mar-13

Mar-14

Mar-15

Mar-16

AEP

0.63%

0.82%

0.83%

15.36%

25.70%

49.43%

60.25%

63.83%

70.65%

Duke

3.20%

3.16%

49.78%

66.56%

65.68%

72.54%

73.67%

70.90%

73.32%

DPL

19.22%

10.09%

19.80%

35.75%

53.35%

62.51%

68.17%

68.17%

71.57%

FirstEnergy

13.47%

0.00%

54.33%

73.89%

77.66%

79.17%

80.67%

77.85%

79.45%

Switching Rate by Percent of Customers Shopping for Energy
Customer %

Mar-08

Mar-09

Mar-10

Mar-11

Mar-12

Mar-13

Mar-14

Mar-15

Mar-16

AEP

0.05%

0.05%

0.11%

0.97%

8.69%

24.39%

30.79%

33.52%

34.96%

Duke

1.65%

4.10%

9.51%

29.58%

28.99%

48.26%

51.77%

47.86%

48.36%

DPL

0.16%

0.09%

0.44%

2.21%

14.35%

33.32%

44.40%

46.66%

45.58%

13.73%

0.00%

48.16%

67.63%

69.27%

73.02%

75.68%

70.37%

69.68%

FirstEnergy

Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. Electric customer choice switch rates and aggregation activity.
http://www.puco.ohio.gov/puco/index.cfm/industry-information/statistical-reports/electric-customerchoice-switch-rates-and-aggregation-activity. Switching rates for FirstEnergy were derived from averaging the
switching rates of Cleveland Illuminating Company, Ohio Edison, and Toledo Edison.
101
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APPENDIX 3.
Total Avoided Cost by Shoppers, by Utility, 2011-2015 (millions of dollars)
Utility
FE
FE
Total

Class
Mercantile
Non-Mercantile
All Classes

Savings
$947.4
$371.7
$1,319.1

Utility
AEP
AEP
Total

Class
Mercantile
Non-Mercantile
All Classes

Savings
$975.9
$150.1
$1,126

Utility
DPL
DPL
Total

Class
Mercantile
Non-Mercantile
All Classes

Savings
$143.3
$65.3
$208.6

Utility
Duke
Duke
Total

Class
Savings
Mercantile
$401.6
Non-Mercantile
$97.7
All Classes
$499.3
Source: the Authors (2016)
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APPENDIX 4.
AEP Columbus Southern GS2S Rate Code Mercantile Prices

AEP CS GS2S
Price to Compare

Non-ByPassable Charges

Ave Contract Rate

0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0

AEP CS GS2S
Total Rate - Non Shopper

Total Rate - Shopper

0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
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AEP Columbus Southern GS3S Rate Code Mercantile Prices

AEP CS GS3S
Price to Compare

Non-ByPassable Charges

Ave Contract Rate

0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0

AEP CS GS3S
Total Rate - Non Shopper

Total Rate - Shopper

0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
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AEP Ohio Power GS3S Rate Code Mercantile Prices

AEP OP GS3S
Price to Compare

Non-ByPassable Charges

Ave Contract Rate

0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0

AEP OP GS3S
Total Rate - Non Shopper

Total Rate - Shopper

0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0

Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University

56

Electricity Consumer Choice in Ohio

Duke Secondary Mercantile Prices

DUKE SECONDARY MERCANTILE
Price to Compare

Non-ByPassable Charges

Ave Contract Rate

0.1
0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0

DUKE SECONDARY MERCANTILE
Total Rate - Non Shopper

Total Rate - Shopper

0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
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Dayton Power & Light Secondary Mercantile Prices

DPL SECONDARY MECANTILE
Price to Compare

Non-ByPassable Charges

Ave Contract Rate

0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0

DPL SECONDARY MERCANTILE
Total Rate - Non Shopper

Total Rate - Shopper

0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
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FirstEnergy Ohio Edison Secondary Mercantile Prices

OHIO EDISON SECONDARY MERCANTILE
Price to Compare

Non-ByPassable Charges

Ave Contract Rate

0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0

OE SECONDARY
Total Rate - Non Shopper

Total Rate - Shopper

0.13
0.12
0.11
0.1
0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
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FirstEnergy Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Secondary Mercantile Prices

CEI SECONDARY MERCANTILE
Price to Compare

Non-ByPassable Charges

Ave Contract Rate

0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0

CEI SECONDARY MERCANTILE
Total Rate - Non Shopper

Total Rate - Shopper

0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
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FirstEnergy Toledo Edison Secondary Mercantile Prices

TE SECONDARY MERCANTILE
Price to Compare

Non-ByPassable Charges

Ave Contract Rate

0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0

TE SECONDARY MERCANTILE
Total Rate - Non Shopper

Total Rate - Shopper

0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0

Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University

61

Electricity Consumer Choice in Ohio

APPENDIX 5.
Table A. Mean Midwestern Electricity Prices in Deregulated and Regulated States, 1990 - 2014
Midwestern Deregulated States
Midwestern Regulated States
1990
0.113
0.096
1991
0.114
0.950
1992
0.112
0.930
1993
0.111
0.090
1994
0.106
0.088
1995
0.106
0.086
1996
0.105
0.084
1997
0102
0.082
1998
0.110
0.082
1999
0.100
0.080
2000
0.092
0.079
2001
0.100
0.085
2002
0.092
0.079
2003
0.090
0.078
2004
0.088
0.079
2005
0.089
0.082
2006
0.092
0.089
2007
0.097
0.090
2008
0.101
0.094
2009
0.102
0.097
2010
0.103
0.099
2011
0.101
0.101
2012
0.095
0.102
2013
0.093
0.104
2014
0.098
0.102
Note: Values are all real dollars 2014 per kWh.
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Table B. Regression Analysis of Suspected State-Level Electricity Price Determinants

In this model, the dependent variable is electricity priceij in the combined industrial, commercial
and residential sectors, where i goes from 1 – 38 states with 13 of them deregulated and 25
regulated, and j goes from 1990 - 2014. The remaining states were listed in the EIA data as being
in “suspended status,” and so were omitted from the analysis. The variables were defined as
follows: statusofde-n was “status of deregulation,” coded with “1” for deregulated states and “0”
for regulated states. The next set of variables were measures of per capita generation capacity
(in megawatts): capacityre-l for the residential sector, capacityco-l for the commercial sector, and
capacityin-l for the industrial sector. The set of variables after that reflected the states’ mix of
resources for electricity generation. Specifically, percentcoa-e gave the percentage of total
quantity consumed of coal, percentnul-i the percentage consumed of nuclear, percentren-t the
percentage of renewable sources, and percentpetr-l the percentage of petroleum. The next set
of variables gave the amount expended by utilities for the various fuels, specifically crudeoilpr-l
gave the cost of crude oil, naturalgas-l the cost of natural gas, nuclearpri-d the cost of nuclear, and
coalpriced-n the cost of coal. The final set of variables gave the fuel prices delivered to the utilities,
specifically consumrene-d was the average price of crude oil delivered to electric utilities,
consumeren-u the average price of natural gas, consumeren-l the average price of coal, and
conumeren-e the average price of nuclear delivered to electric utilities.
Table C Gives the conceptual definition and data source for each variable reported in Table B.
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Table C. Variable Measurement and Data Sources
Variable
Electricity
Price in total
sector

Results searching on data availability
Average price of electricity to ultimate customers by
provider at state level (Dollars/kilowatt-hour applied real
dollars value of 2014 year)

Status of
deregulation

Status of electric utility deregulation in each state
 State with deregulated electricity market (1) :
13states
 State with regulated electricity market (0) : 25 states
 Power plant capacity from Electric Generators,
Electric Utilities (Megawatt) per capita
 Contains information on the Residential,
Commercial, and Industrial sector

Each state’s legislation

The Mix of
Resources
for Electricity
Generation

Percentage of total quantity consumed in each energy
source for electric generation in thousands of megawatthours
 Coal, Nuclear, Oil, and Renewable energy Sources

EIA-923:
2001~2014
EIA-906:
1990~2000
DESIRE

kwh Utility
Fuel Cost

Cost expensed by utilities for use of selected energy
sources
 Number multiplied between the total quantities
consumed in each energy sources and the state price
of each energy source.
 Price per Megawatt hour
 Contains information on the oil, coal, nuclear, and
natural gas
 Net generated amount () * price paid by utility for
fuel

EIA-923:
2001~2014
EIA-906:
1990~2000
EIA-7A
1990~2014
EIA-858
1994-2014

Fuel Prices



EIA-7A
1990~2014

Generation
Capacity






Average price of coal delivered to electric utilities at
the state level in dollars per short ton.
Price of total natural gas in nominal dollars at the
state level
Price is collected by price of uranium purchased by
owners and operators of U.S. nuclear power reactors
in dollars per pound at the national level
Average price of crude oil at the state level
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Data Source
EIA-861
1990~2014

EIA-861S
1990~2014

Natural Gas Storage Report
EIA-858
1994-2014
Uranium Marketing Annual Report

64

